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This report presents an evaluation of the Finnish pension system commissioned by the 
Finnish Centre for Pensions. The evaluation has been prepared over the period 2020 
to 2021.
The report follows a tradition of external reviews of the Finnish pension system as 
reported by Börsch-Supan (2005), Barr (2013) and Ambachtsheer (2013).
The present evaluation focuses on the structure, adequacy and sustainability of 
the Finnish pension system in the perspective of recent reforms and changing 
demographics.
Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused some obstacles for the work, 
precluding site-visits. Virtual meetings have been a workable, but not perfect, 
substitute.
A number of persons have contributed with insights into the Finnish pension system, 
data and responses to my questions, including Suvi-Anne Siimes, Risto Murto, Katja 
Bjerstedt, Ilkka Kaukoranta, Mikko Laaksonen, Pasi Mustonen, Vesa Rantahalvari, Antti 
Tanskanen, Heikki Tikanmäki and Reijo Vanne.
Particular thanks go to Mikko Kautto, Jaakko Kiander, Susan Kuivalainen and Ismo Risku 
for detailed, insightful and constructive comments and discussions on earlier drafts of 
this report.
All errors and misunderstandings remain the responsibility of the author.




The Finnish pension system rests on two pillars: statutory earnings-related defined 
benefit pensions and residence-based and means-tested base pensions (Kela pensions: 
national and guarantee pensions). The earnings-related part of the system has a hybrid 
financing structure including both PAYG and funding, while the base pensions are 
financed via the public budget.
The Finnish model has proven robust and is well functioning, and the outcomes stand 
strong in international comparison. The key strengths of the system are:
• From a citizen’s perspective it is a one-stop-shop with a relatively simple defined 
benefit structure, and portability of pension entitlements across jobs.
• Pension adequacy assessed in terms of both poverty alleviation and replacement 
rates is currently on par with or better than most other countries.
• Automatic adjustment mechanisms linked to longevity – adjustment of benefit 
levels and statutory retirement ages – play a crucial role for the financial viability 
of the system, and therefore its resilience.
The key challenges are:
• The financial viability of the system is challenged in the medium to long run since 
the built-in adjustment mechanisms are not strong enough to ensure a balance 
between contributions and pension expenditures.
• The regulatory framework for pension providers’ investment policies is not clearly 
aligned to the properties of the pension system, and there is a need to analyse 
whether it is adequately calibrated to the risks in the system so as to achieve an 
appropriate return-risk balance.
• The projected real value of pensions and thus material living conditions increase 
across all groups. However, there is a widening gap between pensioners and 
those active in the labour market, and also in the long run a tendency towards 
widening inequality within the group of pensioners.
It is important to stress that the financial challenge develops over time, and there are 
no immediate or urgent problems, but they must be addressed. This can be done in 
many ways within the overall frame of the existing system. It is a robust outcome of the 
projection analyses that a financing problem arises, and neglecting this issue increases 
the likelihood that large changes will be needed at some point in the future. This creates 
uncertainty and has intergenerational distributional consequences. It is therefore 
important to formulate a reform strategy that involves taking a stand on whether 
contribution rates should be increased to allow for pre-funding of future expenditure 
increases or the built-in adjustment mechanisms should be further strengthened to 
minimize the need for discrete interventions in the future.
The following summarizes in more detail the main points of the report.
Pension systems around the world are challenged, not least by demographic changes 
and low return rates. In particular, defined benefit systems are under pressure, and a 
number of countries have made radical reforms moving towards defined contribution 
schemes shifting more risk to the individual.
The Finnish pension system has the earnings-related defined benefit pensions as the 
backbone, and the base (national and guarantee) pensions as a backstop ensuring a 
minimum income for pensioners. Pension entitlements are thus defined in a relatively 
transparent way. From an individual perspective, this has the advantage of reducing 
information problems prevalent in countries where the pension income has many 
sources. From a labour market perspective, portability has the advantage that pension 
rules and benefit entitlements are not a barrier to job-shifts, and this is conducive to 
adjustment and flexibility in the labour market.
The complications in the Finnish system arise on the financing side. Despite the uniform 
benefit rules, the contribution rates differ, and the financing involves both PAYG and 
funded elements. For a number of reasons, contribution rates differ across groups 
although the benefit rules are essentially the same. In a longer-term perspective, it is a 
question of whether different funding rules for similar benefits are acceptable.
Longevity adjustments of both benefits and statutory retirement ages contribute 
significantly to the robustness of the system. While increasing retirement ages are 
justified in terms of healthy ageing, this does not apply to all, and therefore the exit 
routes from the labour market for individuals with reduced work capabilities are 
important. The main routes in Finland are disability pensions, and both their eligibility 
criteria and the financing are important. On the eligibility side, a difficult question is 
whether age (or length of work career) in itself should be assigned weight or if eligibility 
should depend on screening. The financing of disability pensions includes experience 
rating. While experience rating may induce firms to invest in work environment and 
safety, this only applies to large firms. Moreover, the design of the system distorts hiring 
decisions to the disadvantage of more vulnerable groups in society. There is a need for a 
careful reconsideration of the design of the scheme. Especially in a forward perspective 
it is not clear whether the system is capable of coping with the challenges arising when 
the statutory retirement age increases with longevity since heterogeneity within cohorts 
with respect to health, work capabilities etc. may increase.
It is a difficult design problem to settle the division of labour between base pensions 
and the earnings-related pensions since it involves distribution, incentive and financing 
issues. In the Finnish pension system, people out of work due to e.g. parental leave 
or sickness generally accrue pension rights. This is an attractive property, providing 
insurance by making replacement rates less dependent on such events and, moreover, 
it reduces the burdens falling on base pensions. Means-testing of the base pension 
targets the least well-off pensioners but also implies high effective tax rates. Although 
the base pension is phased out over a relatively short interval compared to other 
countries, many persons receive the national pension in combination with an earnings-
related pension. This group faces - via the means-testing of the national pension – 
a high implicit taxation of the higher entitlement to earnings-related pensions following 
from an increase in earnings.
The self-employed are a particular issue in the current design of the pension system. 
Pension contributions are based on self-reported income, but this is associated with 
problems of underreporting. This is problematic since the logic of the system builds on 
the idea that individuals contribute based on their actual income. A possible solution 
would be to base the pension contributions of the self-employed on their taxable 
income, as is the case in e.g. Sweden. One argument given for specific rules for the self-
employed is the funding needs for their business, but it is unclear whether such issues 
should be addressed within the pension system.
While there may be historical reasons for specific schemes for e.g. farmers, it is less 
obvious in present times why rules for the self-employed are not uniform. Over time, the 
role of farmers has decreased while new types of self-employed have appeared. This is 
an argument for considering a uniform scheme for all self-employed. Moreover, trend 
changes in the labour market associated with so-called atypical jobs (the gig economy) 
imply that the group of self-employed may grow, and the present design implies that 
this group may end up with low pension entitlements.
Adequacy
Assessing in terms of outcomes measured by both poverty rates and replacement rates, 
the Finnish pension system is on par or better than in most other countries. Although 
poverty alleviation among pensioners is not complete, fewer pensioners than in the 
population at large fall below commonly used poverty thresholds. Replacement rates 
are also high by international standards.
In a forward perspective, the projected real value of pensions and thus material living 
conditions increase across all groups. However, there is a widening gap between 
pensioners as a group and those active in the labour market. This is mainly a result of 
the life-expectancy coefficient and the wage-price indexation (both the wage coefficient 
and the pension index) falling below the average wage growth in society. While the 
latter contributes to the financial viability of the pension system. The question is 
whether this development is politically sustainable. In the longer run, there is also a 
tendency towards widening inequality within the group of pensioners across education, 
gender, and age.
The adjustment of Kela pensions (guarantee and national pensions) has large 
distributional implications, and the fact that it is only price indexed is a potential 
challenge. Although in the past there have been discrete increases in the base pension, 
a formal indexation rule would contribute more security and equal treatment across 
cohorts. Indexation below wage growth implies that Kela pensions increase by less than 
the poverty thresholds, and therefore relative poverty among pensioners tends to grow. 
Whether this is a politically acceptable trajectory is an open question.
Kela pensions serve the distributional purpose of ensuring that all pensioners obtain 
the politically acceptable minimum living standard. Accordingly, these pensions are 
means-tested, but it is against the earnings-related pension only (guarantee pension; 
all types of pension income). This raises questions on how precisely the least well-off 
pensioners are targeted, since some may have e.g. a low earnings-related pension but 
high levels of wealth. Other countries base means-testing on wider income concepts 
and/or include wealth.
A defined benefit scheme maps labour market outcomes into pension levels. This 
is desirable in terms of replacement rates, but it also implies that labour market 
differences are reflected in pension coverage. This is most notable for the gender 
differences in employment rates and, in particular, in wages being projected into 
pensions. It is open for discussion whether this is a problem created in the labour 
market, and thus should be solved there, or whether it is a problem for the pension 
system per se.
Pension adequacy also depends on how interrupted work careers affect pension 
entitlement. Although pension entitlements are also accrued based on most forms of 
social transfer income, interrupted employment spells can have significant effects for 
pension entitlements.
Sustainability
The long-run financial sustainability of the pension system is challenged since future 
benefit expenditures following from accrued pension entitlements cannot be financed 
by current contribution rates. Although the longevity adjustments (the life expectancy 
coefficient affecting benefit levels and the indexation of the statutory retirement 
age) constitute significant adjustment mechanisms contributing to the financial 
robustness of the system, they are not sufficient. Hence, changes in longevity are not 
fully accommodated by these automatic adjustment mechanisms. A low fertility rate is 
another important demographic factor influencing the financial viability of the system.
Indexation – both the wage and the pension index – raises difficult dilemmas. The 
current indexation rules create some financing space when real wages grow. However, 
they also imply a widening gap between pensions and wage income for the employed, 
and therefore increasing inequality. Without compromising the financial viability of the 
system, there is a choice between initial benefit levels and their indexation to price and 
wage developments.
For the funded part, it is an open issue whether the regulatory framework for 
investments is appropriate and whether changes could allow for a better risk-return 
balance. The funded part constitutes a significant part of the financing. The principles 
underlying the regulatory framework for the investment policies are rather complicated. 
It is a hybrid that has evolved over the years, and it is unclear whether it adequately 
reflects the risks present in the pension system. There is a need for a careful analysis 
of whether the regulatory framework is appropriately designed given the liability risks 
present in the pension system.
Although the financial problems develop over time, it is important to take a stand on 
the strategy to ensure a financially robust pension system. While the problems develop 
gradually, reform strategies have implications for intergenerational distribution, 
eventual reforms have a long phasing-in period, and unsolved financing problems 
leave uncertainty on the future of benefit entitlements and the pension system more 
generally. Addressing the financial sustainability problem is thus of utmost importance 
to ensure the robustness of the system and therefore, ultimately, its credibility. In 
the past, the social partners have taken responsibility in ensuring adjustments and 
changes, and this is also required in the present situation.
The modes of adjustment are contribution rates, benefit levels and retirement ages. 
Given the already implemented longevity indexation, the focus turns to contribution 
rates and benefit levels. An issue of discretion vs rules arises here. Implementing 
reforms from time to time is one way to adjust the system. This has the advantage that 
more information is accumulated but the disadvantage that it creates uncertainty on 
the future design of the pension system. There is also a risk that reforms are delayed, 
which may add to the problems and have unintentional intergenerational distribution 
consequences.
A more rule-based system has automatic built-in adjustment mechanisms (like the life 
expectancy coefficient and indexation of statutory retirement ages to longevity). Such 
automatic mechanisms have the advantage that they are planned well in time and the 
adjustments are only triggered if needed. Since the automatic adjustment mechanisms 
tied to longevity developments are insufficient to ensure the financial viability of the 
system, additional automatic mechanisms are needed. One option is an automatic 
balancing mechanism – as seen in e.g. the Swedish scheme – specifically targeted 
to ensure the financial viability of the system. Such a mechanism can run either via 
contributions and/or benefit levels.
Importantly, public finances are not satisfying the criteria for fiscal sustainability; that 
is, the current tax system is not delivering sufficient revenue to cover projected future 
expenditures following existing welfare arrangements. Demographic trends affect 
the labour force and thus revenue and expenditures on pensions, health and old-age 
care. The fiscal sustainability problem is relatively large in international comparison. 
Ultimately, the financial sustainability of the pension system and other welfare 
arrangements must be considered jointly, and lack of sustainability creates uncertainty 
detrimental to the basic objectives of welfare and pension systems. Moreover, the 
issue of sustainability not only involves the technical specificities but also political 
sustainability: is the system considered fair and delivering acceptable outcomes?
Finally, important inputs into the political discussion are reliable analyses to identify 
challenges, clarify possible solutions and quantify effects and developments. The 
existing analyses provide a very solid basis and valuable inputs to such discussions. 
However, given the importance of these analyses, it is worthwhile to invest more in the 
analytical tools in terms of further model developments.
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1 Introduction
The pension system is the bedrock of welfare systems. It aims at reaching multiple goals 
including poverty alleviation among the elderly population, ensuring decent pension 
levels relative to income prior to retirement, and fair retirement options.
The Finnish pension system rests on two pillars: statutory earnings-related defined 
benefit pensions and residence-based and means-tested basic pensions (Kela 
pensions: national and guarantee pensions). The earnings-related part of the system 
has a hybrid financing structure including both pay-as-you-go (PAYG) and funding, while 
the basic pensions are financed via the public budget.
Designing pension systems involves many policy choices and trade-offs, and therefore 
pension systems tend to get complicated. This is a fact seen in large cross-country 
differences in the structures of pension systems, even among otherwise similar 
countries. This reflects the many design possibilities in combination with different 
political priorities. There is no uniquely best pension system, and most systems 
are hybrid in the sense of including elements of the prototypes of funded and PAYG 
schemes. This factor also makes international comparisons of pension systems difficult.
This report evaluates the Finnish pension system focusing on pension adequacy and 
sustainability, see remit in Appendix I. The following reviews the strengths and weaknesses 
of the system and compares the outcomes to the other Nordic countries as well as to the 
OECD. The outset is a well-functioning pension system1, but there may be scope for some 
improvements and a need for adjustments, not least in light of looming demographic 
changes. Pension systems have a long-time horizon, and it is accordingly important to take 
a forward perspective on the possible challenges and ways to address them.
Specifically, this report is organized as follows: As a background for the subsequent 
discussion, section 2 gives a brief overview of the Finnish pension system. The core 
of the report is organized around the two themes: adequacy and sustainability. 
Section 3 assesses the adequacy of pensions from both a level and distribution 
perspective, including both recent and projected future developments. This section also 
includes an international comparison primarily focusing on poverty and replacement 
rates. Section 4 turns to the sustainability issue, pointing in particular to the role of 
demographic factors (fertility and longevity) and productivity growth. The financial 
viability of current arrangements and various modes of addressing the financing 
challenges are discussed. This discussion includes the funding structure and the 
investment policies for the funded part as well as the interaction between the pension 
system and public welfare arrangements. The section also includes a discussion of the 
methods used for projecting future pensions and the financial viability of the system. 
Finally, section 5 offers a brief summary.
1 The Melbourne Mercer global pension index 2020 ranks Finland 5th among 39 countries, and it is in the 
B tier (out of seven tiers). The report points in particular to a need to increase savings and contribution 
rates, to improve the protection of both parties in case of divorce, and to increase employment rates, 
see https://www.mercer.com.au/our- thinking/global-pension-index.html#contactForm.
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2 The Finnish pension system2
The Finnish pension system is built around a mandatory earnings-related pension 
system. It is a defined benefit scheme which is partly PAYG and partly funded. 
Contributions are made by all employed persons, employers and the self-employed. 
Pension entitlements also accrue during periods when receiving social benefits.
The organisation of the pension system depends on the area of work. The benefit rules 
are similar across the different areas, but the mode of financing differs, cf. below. 
The overall structure of the system is determined in negotiations between the social 
partners.
This section provides an overview of the main characteristics of the Finnish pension 
system. The latest changes to the system are a major pension reform in 2005 and 
a further reform implemented in 2017. It is beyond this report to detail the history 
of the system, and the report takes outset in the structure of the system after the 
abovementioned reforms. The focus is on the forward properties, and therefore the 
text mainly covers key elements of the system applying under current rules, while the 
various transition rules are not covered systematically. Since various reforms are still 
being phased-in, the pension entitlements of many will depend, for a number of years,  
on accruals determined by rules applied in the past.
2.1 Benefit structure
The defined benefit scheme has two core elements: i) Kela pensions made up of the 
guarantee pension and the national pension, and ii) the earnings-related pensions. 
The earnings-related pensions are regulated by a number of pension acts, but despite 
differences across e.g. the private and the public labour market, the schemes are 
harmonized such that benefit entitlements are acquired under (almost) similar rules 
for all, see below. While individual work histories may involve accrual of benefit 
entitlements under a number of pension acts, the entitlements accumulated in the 
different parts of the pension system are aggregated and coordinated such that the 
pension system effectively is a “one-stop-shop” arrangement from the individual’s 
perspective. As a consequence, institutional details and differences are not directly 
important to the individual. This contributes to transparency and is conducive to 
labour market mobility since job shifts have no (major) effect on benefit entitlements. 
Information on individual pension entitlements are accessible via an online platform 
that also shows the consequences of e.g. changes in the retirement age.
Kela pensions (guarantee and national pensions) serve a distributional purpose. Both 
elements are means-tested. The national pension is means-tested against the earnings-
2 The key sources for this section are OECD (2019), EU (2015), Barr (2013) and material at www.etk.fi.
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related pension3, while the guarantee pension is means-tested against all forms of 
pension income. The earnings-related benefits are individualized, but Kela pensions 
have family conditionalities (single versus couples). The benefit structure is illustrated 
in Figure 2.1 for a single (based on amounts applying in 2020). The taper rate for the 
guarantee pension is 100%, reflecting that this element of the Kela pension defines 
the minimum pension benefit across all pensioners. The national pension has a taper 
rate of 50% (and a small deduction), and it is a top-up for individuals with relatively low 
earnings-related pensions. In addition, there may be an entitlement to means-tested 
social transfers, including the housing allowance and the care allowance for pensioners 
and the front veterans’ supplement.
Individuals accrue an annual earnings-related benefit entitlement depending on their 
annual gross income with an accrual rate of 1.5% (since 2017; during a transition 
period until 2025 the accrual rate for the age group 53 to 62 years is 1.7%). In the 
private sector, there is a minimum earnings limit for pension insurance (2020: 60.57 
euros per month), but neither earnings nor contributions have a ceiling, except for the 
self-employed (YEL) (2020; minimum income: €7,959 and income limit: €180,750).
Figure 2.1
Earnings-related pension, national pension and guarantee pension, single, 2020
Note: Net pension is the after-tax value of the pension.  
Source: www.kela.fi.
Accrued pension benefits are indexed by the so-called wage coefficient defined as 
a weighted average of wage increases (80%) and price increases (20%). The benefit 
entitlement at retirement thus consists of the sum of accrued pension rights (including 
accumulated increases via the wage coefficient) during work-life.
3 The part of pensions accrued from period of child homecare and studies is not included in the income 
tests for the national pension.
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At retirement, the actual annual/monthly pension is computed based on the accrued 
rights times the life expectancy coefficient (introduced in 2005 with effect from 2010). 
The latter is an actuarial adjustment depending on remaining life expectancy (mortality 
rates). For a given accumulated benefit entitlement, the annual pension benefit thus 
depends on the expected pension period. This adjustment of benefits to longevity 
reduces the financial exposure of the system to changes in longevity and gives the 
individual an incentive to adjust the retirement age to longevity. Specifically, the life 
expectancy coefficient is based on unisex mortality statistics for the past 5 years and an 
annual discount rate of 2%.
Pensions paid are indexed by the earnings-related pension index defined as a weighted 
average of wage increases (20%) and price increases (80%). The guarantee and 
national pensions are indexed by the consumer price index. However, there have been 
occasional discrete adjustments implying that the average adjustment exceeds price 
increases4 (projections assume a 50–50 weight on price and wage inflation).
All pension income is taxable income but taxed more leniently than wage income due 
to specific tax deductions applying to pension income for both municipal and central-
government income taxation.
However, if pension income after deduction of the abovementioned allowances exceeds 
a threshold, there is an additional central-government tax.
The income concept underlying accrued pension entitlements is gross earnings (wages 
and salaries) for wage earners. For self-employed it is the pensionable income declared 
by the self-employed (so-called YEL income). Individuals without income from work 
accrue pension entitlements if receiving social benefits (parental allowance, sickness 
allowances, home care subsidies and earning-related unemployment allowances), 
completing education (vocational or tertiary education) and during child-care periods.5 
In these cases, the pension entitlement is based on a fixed amount or previous salary.
Voluntary pension saving is possible; contributions are deductible in the income tax, 
and taxable income when paid out. Voluntary pension savings are not important, 
and they are small in international comparison. This may be attributed to the general 
coverage of the earnings-related system, the relatively high replacement rates (also 
with no ceilings on pensions for high-income groups). In 2015 only 2% of total pension 
outlays came from voluntary pension savings accounts, according to Sankala and 
Reipas (2017).
4 There have been discrete increases in the national pension (2001, 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2020), but 
also decreases (between 2015 and 2019) since the regular annual price indexing was either limited or 
abolished altogether. Similarly, there have been discrete increases in the guarantee pension (2016, 
2018, 2019 and 2020).
5 This is quantitatively important. In 2019 about 950.000 persons acquired pension entitlement for 
unsalaried periods. The number of employed persons covered was about 2.4 million persons; see 
Finnish Centre for Pensions (2020).
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2.2 Benefit eligibility and retirement ages
All residents are eligible for the national pension if they have lived in Finland for at least 
three years after the age of 16. The pro rata principle applies, and 40 years of residence 
is required to receive the full amount6. The guarantee pension is available to persons 
receiving national pension or disability pensions; i.e. there is a residence test, but the 
pro-rata principle does not apply.
The statutory retirement age determines the earliest age at which individuals can claim 
the pension benefits. Following the 2017 reform, the statutory retirement age is cohort 
specific. During a transition period, the statutory retirement age increases in steps from 
63 to 65 years (63 years for those born in 1954 or earlier, and increases three months 
per year for subsequent cohorts, reaching 65 years in 2027 for those born in 1962). 
In the future (for cohorts born in 1965 or later, indexation takes effect from 2030), the 
statutory retirement age is indexed to developments in life expectancy. The indexation 
targets that the share of life working relative to years in retirement equals the ratio 
achieved in 20257. This implies that the statutory retirement age increases with 
longevity, but less than one-to-one. The statutory retirement age cannot increase by 
more than two months from one birth cohort to the next (this applies from 2025).
For both the national pension and the earnings-related pension, later retirement is 
possible and is rewarded by an increase in the pension benefit amounting to 0.4% for 
each month retirement is postponed after the statutory retirement age.
Early full-time retirement is not possible under the earnings-related scheme. 
However, partial retirement (25% or 50%) is possible, and pension entitlements are 
(permanently) reduced by 0.4% per month for the share of pensions taken early. For 
cohorts born in 1965 or later, this partial retirement option is available three years 
before the statutory retirement age.
It is possible to combine work and pensions. Legislation requires that employment is 
terminated before the pension can be paid out. Subsequently, it is possible to return to 
work (also with the same employer).
Individuals with a significant loss of work capabilities can be granted a disability 
pension, full or partial (50%). The typical pathway runs via sickness (sickness 
allowance) over rehabilitation (rehabilitation subsidy/fixed term disability pension) to 
the disability pension. The pension benefit equals the pension accrued in the earnings-
related pension system, including the projected accrued pension rights accumulated 
until the statutory retirement age if continued work had been possible (the standard 
accrual rate of 1.5% and the life expectancy coefficient apply). The projected future 
income is based on the average income over the five years preceding eligibility for the 
disability pension.
6 Eventual foreign pensions are included in the means test for the guarantee pension.
7 Specifically, the statutory retirement age is calculated such that the difference between the statutory 
retirement age and 18 years divided by the life expectancy at the statutory retirement age equals the 
value of this ratio in 2025. The life expectancy at a given time is calculated based on the mortality 
statistics for the latest 5 years.
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The years-of-service pension can be granted at the age of 63 to individuals who have 
done mentally or physically demanding work requiring a special effort for at least 
38 years. Moreover, a precondition is a reduction in work capability, but not to the 
extent that a disability pension can be granted. The pension is determined in the same 
way as for the disability pension (but without the projected accrued pension rights). For 
individuals born in 1965 or later, the years-of-service pension is an option in a two-year 
window before the statutory retirement age.
There is also an age contingency in the unemployment benefit system since 
unemployed persons who have met the work requirement after reaching the age of 
58 years have a longer benefit period (500 days, while it in general is 400 days). This 
gives some scope to bridge from unemployment to retirement. This scheme is being 
phased out (fully eliminated by 2025).
Finally, there is a survivors’ pension for the surviving spouse, children or in some cases 
a former spouse (if alimony is paid). The pension is based on the deceased person’s 
accrued pension entitlement (if not retired, computed as for the disability pension) and 
the number of beneficiaries. The maximum share going to the spouse is 50% (no children) 
and 33% to a child (no siblings), respectively. The surviving spouse’s pension is income-
tested against the pension entitlement of the spouse (in payment or accrued). A reform of 
the survivors’ pension (effective 2022) implies, among others, a fixed term (max 10 years, 
applying for persons born in 1975 or later) for the payment of the pension.
2.3 Financing and contribution rates
The funding of pension expenditures varies by pension act, but generally includes both 
PAYG and funding elements. Contribution rates vary between about 13% for farmers to 
about 28% for local government employees (JuEL). Contribution rates have an employer 
and employee component. Pensions of central government employees and parts of 
the pensions of entrepreneurs, agricultural entrepreneurs and seafarers are financed 
from the central government budget8. In the private sector, about 80% of pension 
payments are PAYG financed, and the remaining 20% are funded. The funded part is 
collective in the sense that it has no direct effect on the size of pensions, cf. above on 
pension entitlements. The funding serves to stabilize contribution rates and to pre-
fund expected increases in pension outlays. The funded part is the responsibility of the 
provider that has insured the employee’s work, whereas the non-funded part, or the 
pooled component of the pension, is the joint responsibility of all pension providers 
(coordinated by the Finnish Centre for Pensions). In addition, contributions have a part 
covering operating costs, see below.
The costs of pension entitlements accrued from unsalaried periods are distributed 
between private and public sector pension providers in relation to the insured wage 
sums.
8 In the national accounts, private sector earnings-related pension funds are included in general 
government finances, and their assets in general government financial assets. The surplus in the 
earnings-related pension schemes cannot be used to reduce general government gross debt; it must be 
reinvested.
 Pension adequacy and sustainability – An evaluation of the Finnish pension system 19
Contributions are paid from the age of 17 for workers and 18 for self-employed until 
retirement or age 70 (applies for cohorts born 1962 or later, and it is not indexed to 
longevity; earlier ages apply for older cohorts). For newly self-employed, there is a 
22% discount on the contribution for the first four years of self-employment. When on 
parental leave, no contributions are paid.
For the largest private earnings-related pension scheme (TyEL), the contribution rate 
for 2020 was initially set at 24.4% (the employee share is 7.15% for persons aged 
under 53 and above 62, and 8.65 % for persons between 53 and 62 years of age). The 
contribution rate has the following main components: i) old-age pension (funded): 
3.5%, ii) pooled (PAYG) pension: 19.9%, and iii) disability: 1%. Contribution rates are 
set to ensure the payment of pensions and the funding required by law in the long 
run. The corona crisis has triggered the so-called EMU stabilization scheme, allowing 
a temporary reduction in contribution rates under dire economic circumstances9. As 
a consequence, the contribution rate has been reduced by 2.6 percentage points to 
21.8% for 2020.
Pension companies provide statutory pensions for private sector employees. There are 
industry-wide pension funds, but employers can also establish their own firm-specific 
pension fund, but that is not usual. More than 95% of private sector employees are 
covered by pension insurance agreements managed by pension insurance companies. 
Currently there are four of them (ten years ago there were seven companies). Most 
funds are mutual companies owned by their customers, but dividends cannot be paid 
to the owners. The funds administer the pension policies and manage the funded part 
of the pensions. Although the product (pension policy) is the same, pension companies 
compete on service and rebates. The price differences are based on cost efficiency and 
solvency. Each pension company can annually pay up to 1% of their solvency capital 
as a contribution discount to their customers (these discounts average about 0.5% of 
the private sector wage sum). There is a shared liability across all funds in the event of 
bankruptcy.
The pension expenditures in a given year follow from the defined benefit formula; 
that is, the sum of benefit in payment across all recipients. This defines total pension 
expenditures, a part of which is funded under the responsibility of the pension funds. 
The funded part is determined by the funded contributions and the required rate of 
return (3%). The difference between total pension expenditures and the funded part, 
the pooled pension expenditures, is financed by the pooled contributions. The Finnish 
Centre for Pensions is the clearing central matching pooled pension expenditures and 
contributions.
In a given year, pooled contributions and pooled pension expenditures are not 
necessarily equal for a given pension fund, and buffer funds accommodate such 
differences. The buffers rest with the individual pension funds.
9 The EMU-buffer fund agreed by the social partners in 1997 allows for temporary reductions in pension 
contribution rates under dire economic circumstances. Subsequently, when the economic situation 
improves, contribution rates are raised to replenish the buffer fund (early 2020: about 7 billion euros). 
The buffer fund constitutes 2.5% of the wage sum. In the wake of the corona crisis, the employer’s 
contribution rate has been lowered by 2.6 percentage points and will be increased between 2022 and 
2025 to rebuild the buffer.
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The pension funds accumulate funded contributions and investment returns. Pension 
funds are not required to match pension liabilities one-to-one but are allowed some 
scope for risky investments to generate a higher rate of return. The pension liabilities – 
the technical provisions – are computed based on principles (including a discount rate 
of 3%) approved by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.
Solvency regulations apply only to private sector earnings-related pension providers, 
that is, earnings- related pension insurance companies, company pension funds and 
industry-wide pension funds.
Specifically, the capability of pension providers to carry risk – including insurance 
and investment risk – is determined by the solvency capital. The solvency limit is set 
depending on the investment portfolio so as to ensure that the solvency capital is 
intact with a 97% probability over a one-year horizon. A corridor is defined around 
the solvency capital with the maximum being three times the solvency limit, and the 
minimum 1/3 of the solvency limit. If solvency capital exceeds the maximum, the excess 
must be used for customer rebates. If the solvency is below the solvency limit but above 
the required solvency capital, customer rebates cannot be granted, and a turnaround 
plan must be submitted to the Financial Supervisory Authority. If the solvency capital 
falls below the required solvency capital, a short-run plan must be submitted. 
Investment risk is determined on the basis of 18 asset classes (risk groups). Given the 
expected return and the associated risk, a capital requirement is set for each asset 
class. The overall capital requirement is set taking the correlation between risk groups 
into account.
A part of the technical provisions consists of the so-called equity-linked buffer fund, 
which constitutes between –20% and +1% of the technical provisions. This buffer 
fund absorbs short-run return variations and allows pension funds to adopt a riskier 
investment strategy to increase returns.
Disability pensions are financed via the contribution rate. In 2020, the average 
disability pension component is 1.0 percentage point of the total TyEL pension 
contribution. For private sector employers, the financing includes experience rating 
based on disability pension expenditures relative to the average level. The experience 
rating applies to large companies with an annual wage bill in excess of almost 2 million 
euros. Companies belong to one of 11 contribution categories depending on the size 
of the disability risk measured as the ratio (computed over a rolling two-year window) 
of the funded pension expenditure of newly granted disability pensions to the average 
theoretical disability pension expenditure. The lower the disability pension costs at a 
particular company, the lower the contribution category and thus its disability pension 
contribution. The age distribution of the employees does not affect the determination 
of the contribution category since the pension expenditure is determined separately for 
each age cohort.
However, there are possible selection effects within age cohorts.
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2.4 Discussion
Discussions on pension system design typically take outset in two prototype systems: 
a defined benefit pay-as-you-go pension scheme (DB-PAYG) or a defined contribution 
funded scheme (DC-F). It is well understood that these schemes have various pros and 
cons. For instance, the DC-F scheme offers a higher expected return than the DB-PAYG, 
but the latter is better suited to take distribution considerations into account.
Likewise, the two systems have different implications for risk diversification and thus 
insurance. Hence, neither of the prototypes is ideal, and pension systems are typically 
hybrids including elements of different types of pension schemes.
This also applies to the Finnish pension system, which is a DB-scheme with both 
PAYG and funded financing. From an individual perspective, the DB-benefit scheme 
has the advantage that benefit rules are (almost) uniform across the labour market. 
Distributional goals are ensured via the backstop offered by the Kela pension. Pension 
entitlements are thus defined in a relatively transparent way in a one-stop shop. From 
a labour market perspective, portability across jobs has the advantage that job-shifts 
are not associated with changes in pension benefit rules, which in turn is conducive 
to adjustment and flexibility in the labour market. From an individual perspective, this 
has the advantage of overcoming information problems which are present in countries 
where the pension income has many sources. However, as in most other countries, 
pension issues are a low-interest topic, and both the perceived and actual knowledge of 
the pension system is scant, see Tenhunen et al. (2020).
The complications in the Finnish system arise on the financing side. Despite the uniform 
benefit rules, the contribution rates differ, and the financing involves both PAYG and 
funded elements10. For a number of reasons, contribution rates differ across groups 
although the benefits rules are essentially the same. In a forward perspective, it is 
a question whether different funding rules for similar benefit rules are sustainable. 
Among other things, different funding has distributional implications; see further 
discussion on the self-employed below.
While there is competition between pension companies, it is unclear how strong the 
competitive forces are. Competition can work as a disciplining device to strengthen the 
performance of the companies, which is particularly important given the mandatory 
nature of the system. However, the strength of the competitive factor is questioned 
by the fact that the investment performance of the non-competitive public sector 
pension insurer (KEVA) is on par with the private providers. Moreover, the competition 
introduces a possibility of shift in pension provider as a critical risk factor for pension 
providers, which in turn affects the risk profile of investment policies, see discussion 
below. Allowing a contribution discount of up to one percent of the solvency capital 
10 Vidlund et al. (2016) provide a comparison of contribution rates in Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. They conclude that the total pension 
contribution as a share of the total wage sum or GDP does not differ much across the compared 
countries, and Finland is very close to the average across the eight included countries.
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seems a wide margin given the current low-return environment. There is a need to 
assess these issues more carefully, also in relation to the framework regulating the 
investment policies of the pension providers discussed in Section 4.
The design of the disability pension system is important in a forward perspective. 
Experience rating in the financing of disability pension raises several issues. While 
experience rating may induce firms to invest in work environment and safety, this only 
applies to large firms. Moreover, the design of the system distorts hiring decisions to 
the disadvantage of more vulnerable groups in society. There is a need for a careful 
reconsideration of the design of the scheme. The projections reported in Tikanmäki 
et al. (2019, page 36) assume that disability incidences at given ages decline. While 
this may be justified in terms of recent developments including healthy ageing, less 
physically demanding work etc., there are also trends going in the opposite direction. 
In a forward perspective, it is not clear whether the system is capable of coping with 
the challenges arising when the statutory retirement age increases with longevity, 
and there may be increasing heterogeneity within cohorts with respect to health, work 
capabilities etc.
People out of work due to e.g. parental leave or sickness generally accrue pension 
rights. This is an attractive property since it makes replacement rates less dependent on 
such events, and it reduces the burdens falling on Kela pensions. It is a difficult design 
problem to settle the division of labour between Kela pensions and earnings-related 
pensions since it involves distribution, incentive and financing issues. Means-testing 
of Kela pensions targets the least well-off pensioners but also implies high effective tax 
rates. Although Kela pensions are phased out over a relatively short interval compared 
to other countries11, many persons receive the national pension in combination with 
an earnings-related pension. This group faces – via the means-testing of the national 
pension – a high implicit taxation of the higher entitlement to earnings-related 
pensions following from e.g. an increase in earnings.
The current design raises specific issues for the self-employed. Basing pension 
contributions on self-reported income creates underreporting problems12. This is 
problematic since the entire system builds on the premise that individuals contribute 
based on their actual incomes. One argument given for a special arrangement for self-
employed is the funding needs for their business, but it is unclear whether such funding 
issues should be addressed within the pension system. Moreover, trend changes in 
the labour market associated with so-called atypical jobs (the gig economy) imply that 
the group of self-employed may grow, and the present design implies that this group 
may end up with low pension entitlements. A possible solution would be to base the 
11 In comparison to e.g. Denmark and Norway, see e.g. Andersen (2021). The phasing out has implications 
for targeting, but also for incentives and financing. Clearly, the financing burden is larger, the less 
phasing out there is. The phasing out creates an effective tax rate which may influence savings and 
retirement incentives. The higher the tapering rate, the higher the effective tax rate, but it applies to a 
narrower income interval than a lower tapering rate.
12 Nivalainen and Tenhunen (2020) find that the self-declared income (YEL) is lower than the actual 
income among the self-employed. There is considerable variation among the self-employed both in 
income and in how the self-reported income relates to their actual income.
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pension contributions for self-employment on their taxable income, as is the case in e.g. 
Sweden. While there may be historical reasons for specific schemes for e.g. farmers, it is 
less obvious in present times why rules for the self-employed are not uniform. Over time 
the role of farmers has decreased, while new types of self-employed have appeared, 
and this is an argument for considering a uniform scheme for all self-employed.
All the design aspects discussed here should be seen in relation to the outcomes; 
pension adequacy and the sustainability of the system discussed in the next chapter.
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3 Pension adequacy
The adequacy of pensions can be assessed in terms of both poverty and replacement 
rates. The former is showing the extent to which the design of the pension system 
avoids poverty among elderly citizens, and the latter how the pension system supports 
consumption smoothing over the life cycle. In addition, there are insurance aspects 
associated with how various hazards through life affect the individual pension 
entitlement (including disability pensions), see below.
As a general proviso, it should be remarked that material living conditions for 
pensioners cannot be assessed solely from pension income due to access to tax-
financed welfare arrangements like health care, old-age care etc. These are generally 
needs-tested and therefore also have a strong redistributive effect, see e.g. Aaberge 
(2010) and Vaalavuo (2018; 2020). Taking the provision of welfare services into account 
is especially important when making international comparisons.
This section first considers the recent developments in poverty and replacement rates, 
and then turns to projected developments. The section also includes a comparison to 
the other Nordic countries and the OECD.
3.1 Poverty
Generally, pensioners have experienced increased real income in recent years, see 
Figure 3.1, and the income distribution among pensioners has been relatively steady. 
The average pension income relative to average earnings has been at about 50% of 
average earnings over the period 2000–2017 (falling for disability pensions).
Figure 3.1
Real value of pension benefits across decile groups, 2002–2019
Note: Index year 2019.  
Source: Finnish Centre for Pensions.
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Poverty is conventionally assessed by using income thresholds defined in terms of the 
median income13, and often applied thresholds are 50% (OECD) and 60% (EUROSTAT). 
Figure 3.2 shows the development in the poverty rate for pensioners and all households 
over the period 2002–2019. An upward trend in poverty rates for pensioners was 
broken around 2012, but poverty has risen slightly more recently, irrespective of the 
specific poverty thresholds used. The poverty rate for pensioners is about the same 
level (slightly lower for the 50% threshold) and displays the same development as for 
households generally. Poverty among the elderly is critical since they have few options 
for adjustment. Note the large difference in the poverty rate depending on whether the 
threshold is set at 50% or 60% of the median income, reflecting that many pensioners 
are positioned in this interval.
The national and guarantee pension constitute a relatively constant share of the poverty 
thresholds. The sum of Kela pensions (national and guarantee pension) has been 
slightly above 70% (60%) of the poverty income threshold given as 50% (60%) of the 
median income. Hence, pensioners without earnings-related pension (and pensioners’ 
housing allowances) are at risk of falling below the poverty line.
Figure 3.2
At-risk-of-poverty rate (%) in 2002–2019, poverty threshold 60% and 50% of median disposable 
income
Source: Statistics Finland.
Many pensioners are dependent on the national pension, see Figure 3.3. Among 
all pensioners in 2019, 5% had only the national pension (including, if eligible, the 
guarantee pension), and 32% combined it with the earnings-related pension. However, 
the trend is that fewer receive the national pension. In 2002, 47% received the 
earnings-related pension only, and in 2019 the share was 63%. This trend is expected 
to continue due to increases in accrued earnings-related pensions. Note that the group 
receiving both the national and earnings-related pensions is affected by means-testing 
(see discussion in Chapter 2) and thus the implied incentive effects.
13 Equivalized to take account of household size and structure.
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Figure 3.3
Pension recipients by pension structure in 2002–2019
Source: Finnish Centre for Pensions.
Based on self-reported assessments, about half of all pensioners reported financial 
strains, and about one in ten severe economic problems, see Ahonen et al. (2018). In 
general, individuals with lower income and poorer health face a more difficult economic 
situation, see Ahonen et al. (2019). In particular, those retiring after prolonged periods 
of unemployment or disability more often find their economic situation strained.
There is a selection effect among those continuing working until their statutory 
retirement age – or combine pensions and work – in terms of education, health and 
other socioeconomic factors. These differences also show in geographical differences 
since income levels and thus pensions are generally lower in rural than urban areas. A 
recent study by Rantala (2020) shows that poverty among pensioners is more prevalent 
among women than men, and singles than couples.
3.2 Pensions – levels and distribution
The earnings-related pension system transforms earnings during working life into 
pension entitlements in retirement. Hence, differences in wage and employment levels 
are reflected in earnings-related pensions. There are well known gender differences in 
both wage and employment levels. Accrual during unsalaried periods can compensate 
for differences in employment rates but not in wage levels. This results in a clear gender 
difference in the earnings-related pension, see Figure 3.4. Since Kela pensions are 
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means-tested against the earnings-related pensions, it follows that, on average, women 
receive higher pension supplements than men. Moreover, since women tend to live 
longer and their own pension tends to be smaller than that of their spouse, they also 
receive, on average, the larger part of survivors’ pensions. Irrespective of this, there is 
a clear gender difference in pensions. These differences are projected to narrow only 
very slowly. The median pension for women was about 74% of that for men in 2015, 
and it is projected to be 85% in 2085. However, since the average longevity for women 
exceeds that for men, in general, women benefit more from the pension system in 
a life-time perspective than men, see Tikanmäki et al. (2019). Nonetheless, when 
assessing distributional questions based on annual material living conditions, there is a 
significant difference between men and women.
Figure 3.4
Level and structure of total pension in 2002–2018, by gender (€/month at 2018 prices)
Source: Finnish Centre for Pensions.
Net replacement rates for those retiring in 2017 are shown in Figure 3.5. The median net 
replacement rate for all newly retired is 87%. There is an educational gradient with the 
replacement rate decreasing in the level of education, as should be expected given the 
distributional role of Kela pensions. The median replacement rate for women is lower 
than for men. Within all groups, there is considerable variability in replacement rates. 
Across all persons, the 1st decile cut-off has a replacement rate of less than 61%, and 
the 9th decile cut-off a replacement rate of over 147%. The median replacement rate 
is lower than its mean value; that is, there is an asymmetric distribution with a “tail” 
having high replacement rates.
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Figure 3.5
Median net replacement rates for individual retiring in 2017
Note: Income in 2018 relative to the average income in the years 2013, 2014 and 2015.  
Source: Rantala et al. (2021).
From an individual perspective, there are various hazards affecting pension 
entitlements. Some of these risks are (partly) insured by the system, while others are 
not. The ultimate insurance in the pension system is provided by Kela pensions (the 
guarantee and national pensions, and supplements), setting the lowest level of income 
for pensioners. These pensions are tax-financed, and hence there is collective risk 
diversification via the social safety net and via taxpayers. An important risk factor is 
mortality, which is discussed in Section 4.
The family situation matters for living standards. The benefit entitlement is individual, 
and therefore changes in the family situation do not directly affect accrued pension 
entitlements. But there are indirect effects to the extent that the family work-life balance 
results in one of the spouses (typically women) having a less strong attachment to the 
labour market due to maternity and parental leave as well as part time work. While 
some gender differences in the labour market are counteracted by accrual of pension 
rights during parental leave etc., there is still a difference since the benefit entitlement 
depends on wage income, see Kuitto and Kuivalainen (2021). It is a consequence that 
divorce may have large implications for material living conditions for women. Gender 
differences in pensions are also discussed in Section 3.4.
The individual labour market history in terms of wage income is projected into benefit 
entitlements, cf. above. For periods with unemployment or other reasons for not 
working, pension entitlements are still accrued but based on lower income (partial 
insurance of the risk). Hence, labour market risks translate into different pension 
risks or differences. While gender and socioeconomic differences in the length of 
working lives are modest, differences in pay are an important factor. Kela pensions 
play a crucial role for those with a marginal attachment to the labour market. The role 
of work histories for pension entitlements is documented in Kuivalainen et al. (2020). 
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OECD (2015) presents estimates of the consequences of how incomplete careers affect 
pensions. While the effect of e.g. unemployment and child-care is mitigated in the 
Finnish system, it is nonetheless such that a total period of unemployment of 5 years 
over the work career reduces the pension by 8% for an average-wage worker compared 
to a non-interrupted career.
Mothers staying home in a period totalling 5 years have a drop in pensions of 5%, and 
for a 10-year period the drop is 15%. While this involves both insurance and incentive 
aspects, the current design has a gender bias in the sense that interrupted work careers 
are more prevalent for women than men.
Similarly, benefit entitlements depend on when income is earned over the work-life. 
Since benefit entitlements are indexed by the wage coefficient, which falls below 
average wage developments, and other things being equal, there is an advantage of 
having earnings concentrated later in the life cycle. This is advantageous mainly for the 
more educated groups who are both entering and leaving the labour market later than 
the less educated groups14.
The individual is exposed to price and wage risks influencing accrued pension 
entitlements. First, since both entitlement accrual and pension paid out are indexed 
above price inflation (under the empirical relevant assumption that price inflation is less 
than wage inflation), the real consumption value of the pension entitlement is always 
ensured for the individual. However, there is a risk related to real wage developments. 
Although higher real wage growth leads to higher pension benefits, pension benefits 
decline relative to wages, see below. Moreover, there may be increasing inequality 
among pensioners since the base pensions and earnings-related pensions are not 
indexed in the same way.
3.3 Projected pension levels
The developments in pensions can be assessed both from an absolute and a relative 
perspective. The absolute angle considers the development in the level of pensions, 
that is, the real value of pensions. The relative perspective focuses on pensions relative 
to the general income developments in society. It is a classical discussion whether 
distributional issues should be considered from an absolute or a relative perspective. 
Most policy discussions are based on the relative view, as also reflected in conventional 
measures, including the poverty rate and the Gini coefficient. It should also be noted 
that considering pension levels in aggregate terms over time includes cohorts differing 
in many aspects, including longevity, and hence changes over time may reflect 
composition effects.
The following reports projections of pensions based on the analysis in Tikanmäki et 
al. (2019), to which reference is made for a detailed account of the specific assumptions 
underlying the analyses.
14 Since the wage coefficient is based on average wage developments, it is relatively more beneficial to 
groups experiencing wage growth below the average, and vice versa for groups with wage growth above 
the average.
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A key factor affecting the projections is the underlying productivity, and thus wage 
growth, and how it interacts with the indexation mechanisms in the pension system. 
The indexation of both pension accrual (the wage coefficient15) and pension benefit 
(the pension index16) ensures that the real consumption value of the pension benefit 
does not decline17, but that it generally increases, cf. above. However, it is also a built-in 
property that pension benefits increase by less than wages
Developments in the real values of pensions across educational groups for men and 
women are shown in Figure 3.6. The projection has the highest increases for the highly 
educated, and only moderate increases for groups with primary education. According to 
the projection, the differences in pensions across educational groups remain relatively 
stable in the first part of the projection period, but then widen primarily due to an 
increasing gap between those with primary education and other groups. This translates 
into more widening income inequality among pensioners in the long run.
Figure 3.6
Projection of the real value of median pensions across educational groups, men and women, 
2015–2085
Note: Median pension received by educational level, 2017 prices.  
Source: Tikanmäki et al. (2019).
15 The wage coefficient iwt  can be written iwt =αŵt +(1−α)p̂t , where α is the weight (0.8) to wage inflation (ŵt), 
and 1–α (0.2) the weight to price inflation (p̂t). It follows straightforwardly that iwt = p̂t +α(ŵt − p̂t ). The 
coefficient thus fully compensates for price increases, and compensates real wage increases partially 
(by the fraction α).
16 The pension index ipt  can be written (using the same notation as in footnote 15) i
p
t =βŵt+(1−β)p̂t , where 
β is the weight (0.2) to wage inflation, and 1–β the weight (0.8) to price inflation. It follows that  
ipt =p̂t +β(ŵt − p̂t ). The index thus fully compensates for price increases, and compensates real wage 
increases partially (by the fraction β).
17 Tikanmäki et al. (2019) assume in the baseline scenario that the national and guarantee pensions are 
50–50 indexed to prices and wages, and an appendix compares to full price or wage indexation.
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This is confirmed by Figure 3.7, showing the development in the real value of pensions 
for individuals at different positions (10th percentile, 1. quartile, median, 3. quartile and 
the 90th percentile) in the income distribution for the group of pensioners. All groups 
of pensioners experience an increasing real value of pensions, and in that sense they 
are better off (the absolute criterion). However, while the relation is relatively stable in 
the first part of the projection period, there are widening differences towards the end of 
the period, where the bottom lags behind and the top advances relative to the median. 
There is also a clear gender difference: men generally experience higher growth in the 
real value of pensions than women.
Figure 3.7
Projection of the distribution of pensions, men and women, 2015–2085
Note: Pensions are measured in 2017 prices.  
Source: Tikanmäki et al. (2019).
Turning to the development in pensions relative to the development in wage income 
(the relative criterion), there is a general decline across gender and educational groups, 
see Figure 3.8. The decline is generally larger for men than women. The decline is most 
pronounced in the first part of the projection period, and it may reflect that the current 
group of pensioners has entitlements accrued on various rules applying in the past 
while the outcomes towards the end of the projection period more clearly reflect current 
rules. The composition of the group of pensioners and developments in longevity also 
play a role.
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Figure 3.8
Projection of median pensions relative to educational groups, men and women, 2015–2085
Note: Pensions are measured in 2017 prices.  
Source: Tikanmäki et al. (2019).
It is an implication that relative poverty among pensioners increases. When the base 
pension does not follow the general wage developments, it follows that pensions 
increase by less than the poverty thresholds set in terms of median income (whether it 
is set at 50% or 60% of median income).
3.4 The outcomes of the Finnish pension system in international 
comparison
The outcomes of the pension system can also be assessed by comparisons to other 
countries. A comparison to the other Nordic countries is particularly interesting. 
Within the frame of the so-called Nordic welfare model, similar objectives are pursued, 
although the pension systems differ significantly across the countries, see e.g. 
Andersen (2021). Rather than focusing on the technical details underlying the design 
of the pension systems, the ultimate assessment depends on the outcomes. The 
following considers poverty rates and replacement rates (pensions relative to income 
when working). Comparisons across countries are not straightforward due to differences 
in policy designs, and the following uses OECD data, which allows for cross-country 
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comparisons but at the cost of some simplification18. Comparisons across the Nordic 
countries are particularly interesting since welfare arrangements are more similar. Note 
moreover that international comparisons of pension benefits do not explicitly take into 
account whether pension systems are financially viable.
3.4.1 Poverty
A key distributional indicator is the poverty rate among the elderly, see Figure 3.9. 
For the Nordic countries, the poverty rate for the age group 66–75 is lower – with 
the exception of Sweden – than the OECD average, and also compared to the entire 
population. For the age group above 75, the picture is less clear. Here, Denmark is 
below, Norway is close to, and Sweden and Finland come out above the OECD average.
Figure 3.9
Poverty rates, elderly and the entire population, Nordic countries and the OECD
Note: Percentage of population group with incomes less than 50% of median household 
disposable income. Data applies to 2016.  
Data source: OECD (2019).
Considering gender differences (Figure 3.10), poverty rates are higher among women 
than men in the Nordic countries, while the OECD average is about the same for both 
genders. The gender difference in the Nordic countries can in part be explained by 
differences in household structures with relatively more single person households 
(especially women), see Ahonen and Kuivalainen (2021). For women, Sweden is clearly 
above, Norway and Finland are close to, and Denmark below the OECD average, see 
Figure 3.10.
18 It should be noted that the statistics reported here apply to different age groups including different 
cohorts, and pension entitlements are typically acquired under different rules applying through work-
life. In addition, changes in the cohort composition (education, family structure etc.) may play a role.
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Figure 3.10
Poverty rates, age group 66 years or older, men and women, Nordic countries and OECD average
Note: Percentage of population group with incomes less than 50% of median household 
disposable income. Data applies to 2016.  
Data source: OECD (2019).
Turning to poverty alleviation, residence requirements for public pensions should be 
mentioned. They may play a growing role due to an increasing number of immigrants, 
although Finland has not seen as high an immigration flow as many other countries. 
In all Nordic countries (and most other countries), public pensions have a residence 
requirement, and full pensions require 40 years of residence19, otherwise a pro-rata 
reduction of benefits will be applied. Thus, migrants arriving at more mature ages do not 
qualify for the full pension (and often have lower employment rates). This is particularly 
important for immigrants from low-income countries, who typically do not bring any 
significant pension entitlements with them from their former country of residence. They 
are thus in a high-risk group of ending up in poverty when retiring.20 It should be noted 
that they may qualify for other transfers, e.g. special income transfers, as part of the 
social assistance scheme and housing subsidies. There is a clear overrepresentation of 
immigrants among recipients of national and, in particular, the guarantee pension.
19 There is no residence requirement for the guarantee pension, but for the national pension there is. 
20 As an example, most pensioners falling below the poverty line in Denmark are immigrants, see 
Pensionskommissionen (2015).
 Pension adequacy and sustainability – An evaluation of the Finnish pension system 35
3.4.2 Replacement rates
An important objective for pension systems is to ensure that retirement is not 
associated with a significant drop in material living standard. A metric for this is 
the replacement rate, giving the ratio of the retirement income to the income before 
retirement. Avoiding a drop in material living standard at retirement does not require a 
replacement rate of 100%, since retirement is associated with, among other things, less 
costs of going to work (e.g. transport), less durable consumption (acquired at younger 
ages), and no pension contributions etc.
Replacement rates in the Nordic countries and the OECD average are shown for low, 
medium and high income groups in Figure 3.11. It should be noted that the replacement 
rates are measured relative to wages, and since wage dispersion differs across OECD 
countries, a given fraction of the mean wage selects different groups in different 
countries. Hence, some care should be exercised in such cross-country comparisons. 
In addition, as noted above, pensions should be seen relative to other welfare 
arrangements. In the Nordic countries, health care is publicly provided and heavily 
subsidized21. A given living standard can thus be maintained with a lower replacement 
rate than in countries with more self-financing of health and old-age care.
Figure 3.11
Net replacement rates across income groups, Nordic countries and OECD average
Note: Net replacement rates are computed based on assumptions on earnings during work-
life and taking into account tax payments both when working and being retired. The earnings 
levels are defined in terms of individual earnings, multiple of average; low: 0.5, medium: 1, and 
high: 1.5. Data applies to 2018. 
Data source: OECD (2019).
21 In all Nordic countries, per capita health expenditures are higher than the OECD average, and the larger 
part is tax financed, see OECD (2017b). There are user payments for parts of health and old-age care.
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There are, however, some notable differences in replacement rates across the Nordic 
countries. In Norway and in particular in Denmark, the replacement rate declines 
as income increases. In Denmark, the replacement rate for low-income groups is 
close to 100%, because the level of social benefits to non-employed individuals in 
the work-age population is close to the public pension (the flat rate pension plus 
supplements) offered to individuals without any (significant) private pension22, see also 
Pensionskommissionen (2015). For Finland, the replacement rates are largely invariant 
to the income level, while Sweden has a u-shaped pattern, with the replacement 
rate being highest for low- and high-income groups, and lowest for medium-income 
groups. The first part reflects the distributional concern, and the second part that 
supplementary labour market pensions are most prevalent/extended for high-income 
groups.
Gender differences are smaller in the Nordic countries than across OECD countries. 
This partly reflects the universal coverage of pension arrangements as well as a higher 
employment rate for women. Most mandatory schemes apply unisex principles in the 
sense that mortality rates are not gender-specific when computing the benefit offered 
as life-annuities. In this context, differences between levels and ratios should be kept in 
mind. Differences in wage levels, and hence pension benefit levels, are partly concealed 
when considering replacement rates.
Alternatively, pension coverage can be assessed in terms of pension wealth relative to 
income, see Figure 3.12. Where the replacement rate discussed above gives a snapshot 
view, the pension wealth gives a metric on the total resources available for retirement 
(and thus independent of the specific benefit profile etc.). The pension wealth is the 
present value of the expected pension benefit flows.23 For the Nordic countries, the net 
pension wealth is on par with or higher than the OECD average for low-income groups, 
while the picture is more blurred for the high-income groups. For all income groups, net 
pension wealth is generally smaller for Norway.
22 A replacement rate above 100% arises when social assistance for individuals below the statutory 
retirement age is kept low to ensure sufficient work incentives, and the base/minimum pension is 
higher since there is no work requirement once the retirement age is reached.
23 Note that the pension to income ratio tends to be larger for women than men, given the use of unisex 
mortality tables in pension schemes.
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Figure 3.12
Net pension wealth, gender and income level, Nordic countries and OECD average
Note: Pension wealth relative to individual earnings before retirement. Pension wealth is the 
present value of pension benefits discounted by a real rate of interest of 2%, using average 
mortality by age and gender, and the statutory retirement age. The wealth levels are defined 
in terms of individual earnings, multiple of average; low: 0.5, medium: 1, and high: 1.5. Data 
applies to 2018.  
Data source: OECD (2019).
Finally, private savings depend on the type of pension arrangement. In general, 
mandatory savings crowd out voluntary savings, whether in a DB-PAYG or DC-F scheme, 
see Andersen and Bhattacharya (2011; 2019). However, there is a notable difference 
between the two schemes. A pay-as-you-go scheme tends to reduce total savings, while 
a funded defined contribution scheme tends to increase total private savings (voluntary 
and mandatory). In Finland, as noted above, voluntary pension savings are low. The 
total household savings rate is also low in international comparison24. This can be 
interpreted either as a crowding out of voluntary savings or that the pension system is 
designed so as to deliver an appropriate pension income for most.
24 According to Eurostat data, the gross household savings rate over the period 2016–2019 in Finland is 
about 7.2%, which is much lower than in the other Nordic countries: Denmark (11.2%), Norway (12.8%) 
and Sweden (16.3%).
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3.5 Discussion
Assessing the Finnish pension system in terms of outcomes measured by both poverty 
rates and replacement rates, it is performing on par or better than those in most other 
countries. Although poverty alleviation among pensioners is not complete, relatively few 
pensioners fall below the poverty line (although more than in Denmark and Norway). 
Replacement rates are also high by international standards.
In a forward perspective, the projected real value of pensions, and thus material living 
conditions, increases across all groups. According to the projection, the distributional 
profile is relatively stable in the first part of the projection period but then tends to 
widen in the long run. There is a widening gap between pensioners as a group and those 
active in the labour market throughout the projection period.
The wage-price indexation (both the wage and the pension index) maintains the real 
value of pensions, but it implies that pensions grow by less than wages. While this 
contributes to the financial viability of the pension system (see Section 4), it also 
has distributional consequences, and the question is whether this development is 
politically sustainable.
The adjustments of the base pension (KELA: guarantee and national pensions) have 
large distributional implications, and the fact that it is only price-indexed is a potential 
challenge. Although in the past there have been discrete increases in the base pension, 
a politically time-consistent indexation rule would contribute security and predictability. 
Indexation below wage growth implies that the base pensions grow by less than poverty 
thresholds, and therefore relative poverty among pensioners tends to increase. Whether 
this is a politically acceptable trajectory is an open question.
Base pensions serve the distributional purpose of ensuring that all pensioners obtain 
the politically acceptable minimum pension. Accordingly, these pensions are means-
tested to target distributional objectives. The means-testing is against the earnings-
related pension only (guarantee pensions; all types of pension income). This raises 
questions on the precision of the targeting. Some may have low earnings-related 
pensions but high levels of wealth, and this reduces the distributional precision of the 
means-testing. Other countries base means-testing on wider income concepts and/or 
include wealth. Despite the growth of earnings-related pensions, base pensions are still 
an important supplement for many pensioners.
The tapering rate underlying means-testing is important. In the Finnish case, tapering 
rates are rather high and therefore apply over a relatively short income/pension interval. 
However, many have pension levels bringing them in the interval where means-testing 
matters (their pension consists of both national and earnings-related pensions). This 
design aims at targeting the base pensions to the lower part of the income distribution 
(measured by earnings-related pensions), but implies high tapering rates (50%), which 
in combination with taxation produces high effective tax rates detrimental to work and 
retirement decisions.
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A defined benefit scheme maps labour market outcomes into pension levels. This 
is desirable in terms of replacement rates, but it also implies that labour market 
differences are reflected in pension coverage. This is most notable for the gender 
differences in employment rates and, in particular, in wages, resulting in gender 
differences in pensions. It is open for discussion whether this is a problem created in 
the labour market and should be solved there, or whether it is a problem for the pension 
system per se.
Pension adequacy also depends on how interrupted work careers affect pension 
entitlement. Although pension entitlements are also accrued based on most forms of 
social benefits, there are still consequences of interrupted employment spells, and this 
has a gender bias since interrupted work careers are more prevalent for women than 
men.
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4 Financial sustainability of the pension system
The key elements of any pension system – contributions (taxes), retirement age/period 
and benefit rules – are tightly related by budget constraints whether the system is a 
pay-as-you-go or a funded scheme. In case of fundamental changes, at least one of 
these elements must adjust.
The question is which mode of adjustment to apply when fundamental demographic 
or economic conditions change. In particular, demographic changes driven by trend 
declines in fertility and increases in longevity are challenging the sustainability of 
pension systems in many countries. Both trends affect pension systems critically via 
both the contribution and the benefit side. Changes in other economic factors like rates 
of returns, productivity growth, and employment rates (education) are also important.
The pension system has some built-in adjustment mechanisms – automatic stabilizers 
– ensuring adjustment to changes in fundamentals. As already discussed, indexation 
has implications for how real wage (productivity) growth affects benefit entitlements. 
Adjustment to changes in longevity has recently been introduced via both the 
adjustments of benefits based on the cohort-specific life expectancy coefficient and 
the longevity indexation of the statutory retirement age. Moreover, the EMU-buffer 
is an adjustment mechanism, but it is triggered by discrete decisions. While these 
adjustment mechanisms are very important, they do not ensure that the current system 
can be maintained in the wake of ongoing demographic changes; there is a financial 
sustainability issue.
Adjustments are not only a question of ensuring the financial viability of the pension 
system, but also raise issues in relation to intergenerational distribution and risk 
diversification. Trend changes in fertility and mortality affect cohort sizes and 
compositions, which via the pension system have implications for intergenerational 
distribution. Moreover, via the pension system there is scope for risk diversification 
across cohorts, which is more difficult, or not even possible, in private markets.
An important input to this discussion is an assessment of the financial sustainability 
of the pension system, including how it is affected by changes to fundamentals like 
demographics, rates of returns, economic growth, and employment rates. The latest 
analysis of the financial sustainability of the Finnish pension system is Tikanmäki et 
al. (2019). This section draws on this analysis and discusses various factors affecting 
the financial sustainability of the pension system. The section also includes a 
discussion of the methods used in analysing sustainability issues.
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4.1 Demographic developments
A financing challenge is looming in the future. The main reason is demographics. A 
low fertility rate and increasing longevity imply an ageing of society. The demographic 
developments are here briefly summarized in Figures 4.1–4.3, using World Bank 
projections to allow international comparisons. This projection differs from the 
projection made by Statistics Finland, but the overall trends are the same.
Fertility rates have generally been declining, see Figure 4.1, to a level below 
reproduction of the population (in the absence of net immigration). This tends to reduce 
the population size. This is a common phenomenon across high-income countries.
Figure 4.1
Fertility – Finland and high-income countries, 1950–2100 
Note: Projection for medium scenario.  
Source: UN Population Forecast 2019, https://population.un.org/wpp/.
Longevity has been an increasing trend, in recent times especially for men. Figure 4.2 
shows the life-expectancy at the age of 60, which between 1950 and 2020 increased 
by 7 to 8 years, and a similar increase is projected from 2020 to 2100. There is a gender 
gap, but it is narrowing over time. The longevity increase is strongly associated with so-
called healthy ageing; that is, both physical and mental capabilities of elderly people at 
a given age have increased across cohorts, see e.g. WHO (2017).
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Figure 4.2
Life expectancy at age 60, Finland and high-income countries, women and men, 1950–2100
Note: Projection for medium scenario.  
Source: UN Population Forecast 2019, https://population.un.org/wpp/.
A third potentially important demographic factor is migration. Immigration, especially of 
younger people, is often in policy debates seen as a way to counteract low fertility rates 
and an ageing population. In this discussion, it is important to distinguish between 
the demographic and economic consequences of immigration. Immigration can clearly 
affect the demographic composition of the population, but the economic effects depend 
on the extent to which immigrants become employed. The latter has proven a challenge 
for immigrants from low-income countries in labour markets, such as in the Nordic 
countries, having high qualification requirements for most jobs. Immigration, especially 
from outside the EU, has been low in Finland compared to most other European 
countries, see e.g. EEAG (2020). In a forward perspective, the scope for immigration is 
also constrained by the fact that many countries, e.g. in Eastern Europe, experience a 
rapid ageing of their populations and therefore take steps to avoid emigration of the 
young25.
The net-result of these demographic drivers discussed above is an increase in the so-
called dependency ratio (number of persons aged 65 or more relative to the population 
between 15 and 64 years). While there has been some increase in the past, the 
dependency ratio is on a steeper incline. The increase in Finland is slightly above the 
general trend among high-income countries, see Figure 4.3.
25 An interesting example is Poland, which has recently introduced an income tax break for most young 
below the age of 26 to reduce emigration and incentivize return migration. This should be seen against 
the backdrop of large net emigration flows and an ageing population.
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Figure 4.3
Projected dependency ratio, Finland 1950–2100
Note: Population in age group 65+ years relative to population aged 15–64 years.  
Source: UN Population Forecast 2019, https://population.un.org/wpp/.
4.2 The financing challenge
The demographic changes reviewed above – alongside rates of returns, productivity 
growth and other factors – have important implications for the trajectory for both 
contributions and pension benefits accrued given the current design of the pension 
system. Figure 4.4 reports the projection of contribution rates for private pensions 
needed to ensure financial viability (TyEL), see Tikanmäki et al. (2019). For the next 20–
25 years, the required contribution rate is relatively steady with a weak increasing trend, 
but then it increases significantly. The pooled component reflects the age composition 
at a given point in time. Until 2030, a small increase in the contribution rate is needed 
to ensure that the buffer fund does not fall below its lower limit, and then after a small 
fall, the contribution rate increases alongside the increase in the dependency ratio. The 
funded part is more forward-looking, capturing accrued pension rights that increase 
primarily due to extended working lives. Accordingly, the funded component is steadily 
increasing over the projection period. Sensitivity analyses are reported in Tikanmäki et 
al. (2019), and they show that a robust conclusion is that there is a long-run financing 
issue26. The analysis also reports combined scenarios, and even in the “optimistic” 
scenario with higher productivity growth, higher employment rates and higher 
investment returns compared to the baseline scenario, an increase in the contribution 
rate is required.
26 See also the analysis of the financing of earnings-related pensions in Risku et al. (2020).
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Figure 4.4
Projected contribution rates, TyEL, 2017–2085
Note: The funded component includes funded old-age and disability contributions.  
Source: Tikanmäki et al. (2019).
Consider alternatively an immediate increase in the contribution rate to ensure 
financial viability of the pension system given current benefit rules and the changing 
demographics. In this case, the contribution rate becomes 26.7% over the entire 
projection period, exceeding 24.4% in 2020, but lower than 30.1% in 2085, see 
Figure 4.4. Adopting this path for the contribution rate implies pre-funding27; that 
is, in the near future the contribution rate is higher than needed to finance pension 
expenditures, and oppositely in the far future. In the initial years, more assets are 
accumulated such that they – including the returns – can finance pension expenditures 
in excess of contributions.
It is noteworthy that a sustainability problem remains despite recent reforms (including 
the lifetime coefficient and longevity adjustment of the statutory retirement age). The 
current system does not have sufficient automatic adjustment mechanisms to cope 
with changes in the age composition of the population. The system has a backstop in 
the requirement that contribution rates are set such that buffer funds constitute at least 
20% of the coming years’ pension expenditures, but it is not an automatic mechanism, 
since it requires discretionary initiatives.
27 Private sector pension schemes have been prefunded since contributions exceeded expenditure until 
about 2010 (except during the crisis years in the 1990s). This has accumulated into assets which are 
now an important part of private pension financing.
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The projected required increases in the contribution rate may appear to be a far-
in-the-future problem with amble time to contemplate possible changes. However, 
this conceals important intergenerational implications. Postponing increases in e.g. 
contribution rates until expenditures increase implies a burden shifting to future cohorts 
since the higher future contribution rates will apply to cohorts being active in the 
labour market at that time. Oppositely, if the funded part is increased via an immediate 
increase in the contribution rate, the financing burden falls on cohorts currently active 
who will be pensioners in the future. Hence, how the financing challenge is addressed 
has important intergenerational implications; see also discussion below on fertility. 
Postponing the adjustment is not distributionally neutral, which is why the financial 
challenge, although not an acute problem, must be discussed.
4.3 Automatic adjustment mechanisms
While textbook models define PAYG pension schemes as having a period-by-period 
balanced budget, this is neither feasible nor desirable in practice. On the practical 
side, total contributions and pension expenditures fluctuate for many reasons, and 
they cannot be determined with full accuracy in advance. Adjusting contribution rates 
or pension benefits ex post to balance the budget is not desirable and thwarts one of 
the key objectives of pension systems: to provide security and predictability. Moreover, 
year-by-year changes in contribution rates have efficiency costs via work and savings 
incentives. Smoothing contribution rates minimizes potential distortionary effects. This 
argument applies both to short-term variations and to situations where there is a trend 
in the financing needs. Allowing for budget variations also provides risk diversification 
across employers, employees and pensioners compared to a situation with changes in 
either contribution rates or benefit levels to balance the budget on a period-by-period 
basis.
Therefore, pension systems, even though not fully funded, have pre-determined 
contribution rates and benefit rules and operate with buffer funds to accommodate 
short-run variations in contributions and benefits. This is also the case in the Finnish 
system, which also has an element of funding.
However, this leaves the problem that predetermined contribution rates and benefit 
rules may not ensure a solvent system, that is, a balanced budget on average across the 
short-run variations in contributions and pension expenditures. If the given contribution 
rate and benefit rules are not viable, something will have to give in. This is particularly 
the case when trend changes develop systematic imbalances, as most recently 
discussed in many countries in relation to the upward trend in longevity. This raises 
difficult problems on how and when to adapt to such changes.
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In principle, two approaches are available: either discrete changes from time to time, 
or built-in automatic adjustment mechanisms coping with changes affecting the 
financial viability of the pension system. The latter refers to explicit contingencies 
linking contribution rates or benefits to demographics, macroeconomics and financial 
variables. The choice between the two alternatives raises political economy issues 
since discrete changes may be subject to reform delay causing the adjustment 
problems to grow and having implications for intergenerational risk diversification 
and distribution. Rules have the potential advantage that they are less vulnerable to 
political procrastination, and therefore they can strengthen the credibility, continuity 
and consistency of the pension system. By adopting rules, the focal point in political 
discussions is changed from being a question of the need for reforms to a question of 
violating predetermined rules; the political costs of procrastination increase. Clearly, 
all of this presumes support for the rules in the first place. Rules typically also imply 
more gradual changes than discrete reforms undertaken from time to time, often in 
an atmosphere of crisis. Generally, rules do not eliminate risks since they are state-of-
nature contingent, but political risks are reduced.
Discrete changes depend on particular projections of future developments. But such 
projections are uncertain and may subsequently be revised. Moreover, this approach 
leaves it uncertain when and how sustainability problems will be resolved. Automatic 
adjustment mechanisms are a more flexible way of adjusting to new information, e.g. 
indexation of the statutory retirement age does not require that a stand is taken today 
on longevity in say 20 or 30 years, but it ensures that there are adjustments if longevity 
actually increases.
Automatic adjustment rules basically make contribution rates and/or benefit levels 
dependent on the state of nature in some pre-specified way. The challenge here is 
implementation. While, in principle, it is possible to design sophisticated rules coping 
with all eventualities, actual rules must be simple. Hence, rules can cope with some 
adjustment problems, but it is not realistic that the pension system can be completely 
“automated”.
The Finnish pension system includes two automatic adjustment mechanisms in relation 
to longevity: the life expectancy coefficient adjusting benefit levels, and the longevity 
indexation of the statutory retirement age. These are important adjustment mechanisms 
reducing the importance of the upward trend in longevity for the financial sustainability 
of the pension system, see discussion below.
Note that there are additional automatic mechanisms in the system via indexation 
– the wage and the pension index – which are important for pension adequacy (see 
discussion above), although they also have financing implications, to be discussed 
below. The EMU-fund is an adjustment mechanism on the contribution side which is 
unique in international comparison, but it relies on discrete decision-making.
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While automatic adjustments of benefits and statutory retirement ages are crucial 
for the financial viability of the pension system, they do not respond to all changes 
affecting the dependency ratio. One such factor is fertility, discussed below. In 
principle, properties of the pension system could be linked to cohort fertility, but this 
is less straightforward than indexation of statutory retirement ages to longevity. This 
raises the question whether more general contingencies related to the overall solvency 
of the system could be introduced. Such general contingencies are less common, but 
there are two notable cases.
The German pension system has a sustainability mechanism linking both contributions 
and benefit entitlements to the developments in the ratio between contributors 
and beneficiaries. Specifically, the ratio is defined as the number of contributors to 
pensioners, taking into account contribution bases and the number of pensioners 
receiving the minimum pension. If this ratio declines, the contribution rate increases 
and benefit levels decrease, see e.g. Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2006) and Vidal-Meliá 
et al. (2009). While this adjustment mechanism more broadly targets demographic 
changes, it is not tightly related to the solvency of the system.
The Swedish NDC has an explicit solvency-based mechanism, see e.g. Palmer (2000) 
and Pensionsmyndigheten (2011). Pension accruals and benefits are regulated by the 
income index (defined as the growth rate of the contribution base). To ensure that the 
pension system is financially viable, indexation may be reduced below the income 
index; that is, pension accrual and benefits in payments are adjusted. The trigger is the 
so-called balance ratio given as the ratio of the system assets to liabilities. The assets 
are current and expected future contributions to the system plus buffers funds, and the 
liabilities are the pension payments to current pensioners and current contributors. If 
the balance ratio is lower than one, the indexation of accruals and benefits is reduced 
below the income index. If the ratio is above one, buffer funds are accumulated. 
The adjustment thus both affects pension accrual (future pensioners) and pension 
benefits (current pensioners). Although the contribution rate is constant, less pension 
entitlements are accrued, and pension benefits in payment are reduced.
There is a strong case for the strengthening of the automatic adjustment mechanisms, 
but there are important decisions to be made in both defining the appropriate triggers 
and how the adjustments should be split between contribution rates, benefit levels 
and statutory retirement ages. Answering these questions would require a detailed 
analysis considering the workings of such adjustment mechanisms across a variety of 
demographic and economic changes impacting the pension system.
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4.4 Fertility
The fertility rate affects the relation between the number of contributors and 
beneficiaries. Population growth is part of the implicit return offered by a PAYG scheme. 
If the number of contributors grows more than the number of pensioners, individuals 
receive more in old-age pensions than they contributed as young, and vice versa (see 
box below).
Family choices on fertility thus affect the pension system. Other things being equal, 
a higher fertility rate eases the financing of a defined benefit scheme, and it is a 
fundamental source of the system’s implicit return. Clearly, this is an aggregate effect 
too small to be taken into account in the fertility decision of potential parents; see e.g. 
Cigno and Werding (2007) for discussion and references. This gives an argument for 
child allowances to achieve the socially optimal level of fertility (see e.g. Groezen et 
al. (2003)) or making pensions positively dependent on the number of children (see e.g. 
Sinn (2001)). Introduction of automatic adjustment mechanisms linked to fertility is less 
straightforward than longevity indexation and probably also has less public appeal.
For Finland, fertility rates have been on a downward trend and are projected to fall 
further/stabilize at a low level, see Figure 4.1. This raises a question of how the pension 
system can cope with the implications. The effects are potentially large. In the long-term 
projections, the fertility rate is set at 1.45, and the required contribution rate (for TyEL) 
increases from 24.4% to 30.1%, see Figure 4.4. If the fertility rate instead becomes 
1.7, the contribution rate projected for 2085 is 3.2 percentage points lower than in 
the baseline projection, while a fertility rate of 1.2 increases the contribution rate by 
4 percentage points.
The long lags for changes in fertility rates to affect the dependency ratio underline the 
importance of long- term policy planning in pension policies. A low fertility rate gives a 
prefunding argument; that is, increase contribution rates now to accumulate funds to 
counteract the consequences of low fertility rates. In this way, the cohorts having fewer 
children instead contribute more to their pensions by paying higher contribution rates. 
Postponing an increase in the contribution rate to the future shifts the financing burden 
on to the smaller cohorts; that is, they end up financing the consequences of their 
parents and grandparents having fewer children.
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Box I: PAYG pensions: Demographics, productivity growth and indexation
Consider the following simplified version of a PAYG pension system. The balanced budget 
constraint for the scheme reads
  τt Nt wt = Nt–1 bt
where τt is the contribution/tax rate, Nt is the number of workers, wt the wage income of those 
working, Nt–1 the number of pensioners, and bt the pension level. Hence, Nt wt  is the wage sum 
in period t. The system has an implicit return of the system given as the future pension benefit 
relative to the contribution made when working, which for a constant contribution rate (τt =τ for 
all t) is
  bt+1  =
  Nt+1 wt+1 
  τwt        Nt wt
The implicit return equals the growth rate of the wage sum, or the sum of population growth 
and wage (productivity) growth. This is a basic insight from the pension economics literature. 
Consider now a DB system where the pension (bt ) is determined by the benefit rule





   is the wage coefficient, see footnote 15. Given the defined benefits, a strict PAYG 
system requires that the contribution rate adjusts to balance the budget. Inserting the benefit 
formula in the budget constraint yields




and the period t contribution rate becomes
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Defining wage growth as  wt–1≡ 1+ŵt  , the contribution rate can be written
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This expression shows how the contribution rate financing the defined benefits would have to 
adjust to changes originating from demographics ( 
Nt−1 ) and wage-price developments (         ).  
         Nt
 
                    1+ŵt 
The demographic part implies that a decrease in fertility (Nt < Nt−1 ), other things being equal, 
requires an increase in the contribution rate. Similarly, while not explicit in the present 
formulation, an increase in longevity (for an unchanged retirement age) requires an increase in 
the contribution rate. The price-wage part implies that the contribution rate decreases when real-
wage (productivity) growth increases. If the indexation of pension benefits falls short of wage 
growth, iwt
  < ŵt. Let i
w
t
  =(1−α)p̂t +αŵt, corresponding to the applied wage coefficient, it follows that
  1+ iwt
   
=
 1 + (1–α)p̂t + αŵt 
  1+ŵt             1 + ŵt            
 ~= 1–(1−α)(ŵt −p̂t )
This shows that higher real wage (productivity) growth reduces the required contribution rate 
when benefits are adjusted by less than wage growth. Phrased more generally, if pension accrual 
and benefits are indexed by less than wage growth, higher wage growth creates some financial 
space in a PAYG pension system.  
1+ iwt
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4.5 Mortality and longevity
The pension system offers pensions which are implicit annuities; that is, the benefits 
are paid for the remaining lifetime. Hence, the individual does not face a risk that 
pension benefits are exhausted if reaching high ages. Moreover, given the indexation 
schemes, the real purchasing power of the pension will not decline but is likely to 
increase, although a decline cannot be completely ruled out. 
It is an attractive property of a pension scheme that it offers annuities, and it is in 
accordance with a basic result in the pension literature by Yaari (1966) that the 
fundamental risk associated with the length of life and thus the need for savings 
is perfectly resolved by saving in annuities28. From a welfare state perspective, 
annuitization serves to ensure that all pensioners have an acceptable material living 
standard (in the Finnish case with a backstop in terms of the base pension). Supposing 
counterfactually that the earnings-related pensions where not annuities but paid out 
over a given number of years, some of the elderly population would experience that 
their earnings-related pension would not cover their remaining lifetime. This would 
require larger precautionary savings, or the burden on the tax-financed base pensions 
would be larger. Likewise, public provision of health care, old-age care etc. constitutes 
implicit life-annuities reducing the need for precautionary savings. The overall 
arrangements thus provide insurance against longevity and health hazards.
Provision of annuities is not a given, and market solutions are often incomplete, or 
agents choose annuitization to an insufficient degree; see e.g. Modigliani (1986) and 
the so-called annuitization paradox. The mandatory earnings-related pension scheme 
thus effectively creates an implicit annuitization market overcoming potential market 
failures, and this has a value for risk-averse households. The annuities in the Finnish 
pension system are based on the average mortality rates for the cohorts. Post the 
setting of the statutory retirement age and life expectancy coefficient, all changes in the 
cohort-specific mortality rates are collectively insured (do not affect benefits).
Longevity trend
Longevity has been on an upward trend historically, and although demographic 
projections are uncertain, an increase in longevity is to be expected with a high 
probability. The uncertainty pertains to how large these increases will be and when/
if they level off at some point. This is a global phenomenon and a major challenge for 
pension systems and public finances.
The immediate effect of an increase in longevity in a defined benefit scheme with a 
given retirement age is an extended retirement period. For unchanged contribution/
tax rates, this challenges the financial viability of the system. Moreover, there are 
intergenerational implications since older cohorts benefit from increases in the 
retirement period, while the implied financial burden falls on the younger cohorts in 
28 It is often argued that annuities make it impossible to leave bequest. This is not the case, since not all 
wealth is annuitized. Moreover, individuals with strong bequest motives can save out of pensions to 
leave bequests.
 Pension adequacy and sustainability – An evaluation of the Finnish pension system 51
the contributing phase of the life-cycle. Granted that an increase in longevity is welfare 
improving, it can be questioned whether the financial consequences should fall on 
the shoulders of younger generations or whether those benefitting from the increased 
longevity should contribute to its financing; see Andersen and Pedersen (2006). 
Increasing the retirement age alongside increases in longevity is an adjustment strategy 
balancing the number of years an individual is contributing to and benefitting from 
the system. A key argument in support of this solution is that increasing longevity is 
strongly associated with healthy ageing; that is, more years in relatively good health 
are added to the life-span, which in turn makes it feasible to postpone retirement from 
the labour market. Such longevity indexation of retirement ages has been introduced 
by many countries in response to the trend increase in longevity, although the specific 
indexation formulas differ, see OECD (2017a). These changes are associated with 
increases in employment rates for the affected age groups.
The life expectancy coefficient in the Finnish pension system adjusts the annual benefit 
flow to the life expectancy for members of a given cohort. If longevity goes up, the 
annual benefit falls, and this gives the individual an incentive to postpone retirement 
to avoid this reduction in pension benefits. However, if individuals do not respond in 
this way, a political problem can arise as a result of declining pensions. It is an open 
question to what extent such incentives affect retirement decisions29. This is the reason 
for linking both benefit levels and retirement ages to longevity.
Empirical evidence documents the very strong statutory influence statutory retirement 
ages have on retirement decisions with so-called bunching of retirement ages at the 
statutory retirement age; see Blundell et al. (2016), Gruber and Wise (2004), and Bösch-
Supan et al. (2018). This suggests that it is important to change the statutory retirement 
age to ensure later retirement. Sweden is an interesting example since the Swedish 
system for some years has had built-in incentives for individuals to postpone retirement 
alongside increases in longevity. However, retirement ages did not respond much to 
increases in longevity; see e.g. Pensionsåldersutredningen (2013). In response to 
this, an explicit longevity indexation of the statutory retirement ages has recently been 
implemented.
Longevity indexation has furthermore the advantage that it removes the problem of 
predicting longevity far into the future and determining statutory retirement ages or 
benefits based on such predictions. The lead time by which the statutory retirement 
age is locked for a given cohort is important for planning and risk sharing. Any changes 
in longevity before the statutory retirement age is locked fall on the cohort, while those 
appearing later are collectively insured since retirement ages and benefits are not 
adjusted ex post.
The lead time also has implications for individual planning. The current arrangement 
locks the retirement age (and life expectancy coefficient) of a cohort when it turns 
29 This also points to a political dilemma. If many retire early (retiring before the target retirement age), 
it has a systemic effect on the financing of the pension system – a fact not internalized in individual 
decision-making. Even though the benefit flow is reduced due to the longer retirement period, this may 
subsequently create a political pressure for measures to improve the position of pensioners.
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62 years, which is a relatively short lead time. Going forward, increasing longevity 
increases the lead time, but the present arrangement implies that the lead time differs 
across cohorts. Alternatively, the scheme could be changed so as to always lock the 
statutory retirement age with a lead time of e.g. five years for each cohort.
There are a number of technical issues to discuss on the specific design of these 
automatic adjustment mechanisms.
Indexation is based on longevity assessed using the so-called calendar method. When 
there is a trend increase in longevity, this method tends to underestimate the cohort-
specific longevity. As an example, according to the calendar method the remaining life 
expectancy at the age of 63 is 22.3 years in 2020, 23.8 years in 2030, and 26.7 years 
in 2055. However, according to the cohort method, the remaining life expectancies 
are 24.4 years in 2020, 25.7 years in 2030, and 28.2 years in 2055; see Tikanmäki 
et al. (2019, p. 109). Consequently, the retirement age increases by less under the 
calendar method than the cohort method when there is an underlying upward trend 
in longevity. There is a corresponding longer retirement period, which is collectively 
financed, and it effectively implies that cohorts are treated differently.
Whether this is an intended policy or it should be changed by basing the indexation on 
the cohort method is an open question. An advantage of the calendar method relative 
to the cohort method is that the latter relies on predictions while the former is based on 
actual observations.
Importantly, despite these two crucial adjustment mechanisms linked to longevity, 
the financial viability of the pension system is not neutral with respect to changes 
in longevity (mortality rates). This is seen from the long-term projections reported 
in Tikanmäki et al. (2019). In the baseline scenario, the contribution rate increases 
(TyEL) from 24.4% in 2020 to 30.1% in 2085. The required contribution rate becomes 
32.4% in case of lower mortality/longer longevity (for persons above the age of 50, 
the mortality function is shifted one year at 15-year intervals, with interpolation for in-
between years).
This point is also seen by comparing the statutory retirement age with the so-called 
target retirement age. The latter is defined as the retirement age that neutralizes the 
effect of longevity on the pension benefit arising via the life expectancy coefficient. 
The target retirement age is higher than the statutory retirement age, see Tikanmäki 
(2019, Table 4.2), and the gap is larger for younger cohorts due to the upward trend in 
longevity. As an example, the statutory retirement age for the cohort born in 1985 is 
projected to be 67 years and one month, while the target retirement age is 69 years and 
10 months, that is, 2 years and 9 months higher. This gap between the statutory and the 
target retirement age is increasing over time due to the upward trend in longevity. The 
target retirement age does not have an explicit role in the pension system, but it serves 
as a signal on the role of longevity for the pension system and brings the indexation of 
the statutory retirement age in perspective.
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4.5.1 Heterogeneity in longevity
Longevity adjustments via both the life expectancy coefficient and the statutory 
retirement age are based on average cohort mortality. However, it is well established 
that there is substantial heterogeneity with a strong socio-economic gradient in 
longevity; see Bosworth (2018) for an overview, and Tarkiainen et al. (2013) for an 
analysis for Finland.
This raises the question whether the distributive aims built into the pension scheme are 
counteracted by a regressive element to the extent that high income/educated groups 
have longevity above the average. This applies both to the benefit levels and retirement 
incentives. Since benefits are life-long, groups with longevity above the average gain 
from this arrangement compared to an actuarial fair scheme. Moreover, the premium 
to delayed retirement (0.4%+1.5% accrual) is also more attractive to groups with high 
longevity (conditional on reaching the statutory retirement age) since the gain from later 
retirement comes from higher pension benefits in the form of life-annuities.
The differences in mortality rates, and thus longevity across groups, raise several 
issues. The first is that the clearest socio-economic divide in longevity is between 
men and women. The system is thus distributing in favour of women, which may be a 
politically desirable feature, see Chapter 3. Less so is the implied distribution from low 
skilled to highly educated. However, having one and not the other is difficult.
In theory, a solution would be a split of the population into risk classes. This may be 
politically controversial. In economic terms it is not straightforward either. Differences 
in mortality are not entirely exogenous and depend on behaviour (a moral hazard 
problem). Allowing for risk classes also introduces selection problems since mortality 
rates have multiple causes, and therefore a classification based on some characteristics 
would leave heterogeneity within the defined classes. This creates an adverse selection 
problem and may also be politically problematic. A further problem is that information 
on mortality rates develops through life (differences in age-conditional survival 
rates tend to increase with age, at least up to some point). Hence, the individual risk 
classification may change over the lifespan, posing a difficult implementation problem.
In assessing the risk and distribution implications, it is crucial to keep in mind what 
is being compared. A mandatory pension system is largely motivated by individuals 
on their own saving insufficiently for old age, market failures in annuity markets and 
distributional concerns. It is therefore not meaningful to compare the existing pension 
system to some ideal but unrealistic first best world30. The current arrangement must be 
evaluated relative to an environment with market failures and behavioural imperfections. 
In this second-best setting, it is important that the system is providing insurance which is 
not readily available in private markets (or only at high costs). Moreover, there are other 
elements of the pension system – and welfare arrangements more generally – that do 
not suffer from this regressive bias. This includes disability pensions, accrual of pension 
benefits when out of work etc. Ultimately, the (re)distributive role falls on the public 
30 Even computing the expected present value of the existing system for specific groups implicitly assumes 
that there are markets that offer different (annuity) prices to different risk classes.
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sector. The earnings-related pension scheme is not designed to be redistributive, Kela 
pensions are, and they are tax-financed.
Increasing the statutory retirement age may put pressure on early exit routes from 
the labour market. While the longevity indexation is motivated by “healthy ageing”, 
these developments are associated with heterogeneities across the population. Not 
all experience healthy ageing, and for this group the “early retirement” options are 
important. In a forward perspective, the pressure on the system is likely to be larger, 
and this raises the question whether the current system (including disability pensions, 
years-of-service pension) can cope with these developments. There is a need to 
carefully consider the design of the exit routes. It should also be kept in mind that 
the increase in the statutory retirement age is crucial for the financial viability of the 
pension system given the upward trend in longevity. Keeping statutory retirement ages 
unchanged to avoid the above-discussed problems is not an obvious solution, it is 
financially demanding, and it also has distributional implications.
4.6 Productivity growth
A PAYG pension scheme offers an implicit return, which is basically determined by the 
growth of the wage sum, see Box I. Hence, for a given contribution rate, the pension 
can grow by the growth rate of the wage sum. In the simplest case – with constant 
employment, retirement age, and longevity – this equals the growth rate for wages. 
The Swedish notional defined contribution pension scheme offers an implicit return 
determined by the growth of the wage sum, but with the crucial proviso that benefits are 
regulated by less if the financial viability of the system is not ensured, see above.
The benefit rule in the Finnish system has indexation below the wage growth rate. This 
applies both to the accruals indexed by the wage coefficient and pension benefits 
indexed by the pension index, see discussion above. Hence, although higher wage 
(productivity) growth increases absolute pension expenditures, they decline relative to 
GDP or the wage sum. This creates a financial space that can be used to finance other 
changes (see Box I).
To illustrate, the long-term projections reported in Tikanmäki et al. (2019) assume 
that long-term productivity growth is 1.5% per year. In the baseline scenario, the 
contribution (TyEL) increases from 24.4% in 2020 to 30.1% in 2085. If long-term 
productivity growth is 2% per year, the contribution rate increases only to 29.4%, while 
a productivity growth rate of only 1% implies a contribution rate of 30.6%. Hence, the 
higher productivity growth, the smaller the financial sustainability problem.
This shows a dilemma in the design of the system. On the one hand, indexation below 
wage growth leads to a widening gap between pensions and earnings of the working 
population and thus income inequality (although indexation ensures that the real value 
of pensions is protected, see Chapter 3). On the other hand, this reduces the financial 
sustainability problem. Full indexation to wages would thus create a straightjacket for 
economic policy in the sense that all initiatives to boost productivity – in part or fully 
motivated by financing problems arising from an ageing population – do not contribute 
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to solving the sustainability problem31 since pensions and thus pension expenditure 
rise proportionally with productivity.
Oppositely, it may be questioned whether indexation below wage growth is politically 
time-consistent; that is, will a trend decline in pensions relative to the income of the 
working age population be acceptable or does it create a political pressure which 
eventually would lead to an increase in pension benefits?
Finally, note that indexation can be changed without necessarily impairing the financial 
viability of the system based on actuarial principles. For a given expected present 
value of benefits there is a relation between the initial level and the profile over time of 
benefits; the higher the initial value, the less the increases in the future, and vice versa. 
The pension index implies, as discussed above, that the real value of the benefit is 
always ensured and there is an increase as a fraction of real wage increases in society. 
Taking an actuarial perspective, the indexation could be changed to have, e.g., higher 
weight on wages, and therefore a lower initial pension. This would imply that the 
pension benefit over the pension period is more closely aligned to wage development 
and thus the general development in material living conditions in society. In choosing 
between the level and profile of benefits, there is also a question of whether needs 
are declining with age, which gives an argument for a high initial level and a less steep 
profile. There is also a distributional aspect attached to the profile of benefits over the 
retirement period. The actuarial adjustment in the life expectancy coefficient is based 
on average mortality rates. A relatively high initial value of benefits is advantageous to 
those with relatively short longevity, and vice versa. Moreover, the pension index cannot 
be seen independently of the indexation of Kela pensions. If Kela pensions are indexed 
by less than earnings-related pensions, they decline in relative importance over the life-
time, and vice versa. It is an open question whether this is a desirable design feature.
4.7 Funding
Pensions are financed by a mixture of PAYG financing and funding. Funding has the 
advantage that it generates a higher return (=market return) than the implicit return in a 
PAYG financed scheme. This also applies currently, although risk free rates of returns are 
low (or even negative at some maturities) since the relevant comparison is to a wider 
set of assets (marginal product of capital), see e.g. Blanchard (2019). The challenge for 
a funded scheme is that it takes time to build up the funds, while a PAYG scheme offers 
an immediate financing option.
For private sector pensions, funds have been accumulated in the past due to 
contribution rates exceeding the level required on a PAYG basis. The funding currently 
contributes a non-trivial part of pension financing amounting to 20% of total pension 
expenditures. The financing problem faced by the pension system discussed above 
raises the question whether contribution rates should be increased to further 
strengthen pre-funding.
31 Clearly, there can still be gains in other dimensions; the general living standard would be higher.
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A crucial question in relation to the funded part is whether the design of the regulatory 
framework is appropriate. In Finland, solvency regulations apply only to private sector 
earnings-related pension providers32. In other countries, occupational pension insurers 
follow national or European (Solvency II) solvency regulations. The latter builds, among 
others, on the premise that pension providers face the risk that individual savers can 
shift provider at short notice, and therefore a short-run risk measure is relevant. The 
Finnish pension system differs in a number of respects, and this justifies having a 
different regulatory framework.
The current regulatory framework for the funded part (discounting of liabilities, solvency 
capital, solvency limits, equity-linked buffer fund) is relatively complicated, and it is 
unclear whether it sets the appropriate framework for pension providers, in particular 
their investment policies.
The funding in the Finnish system is different than in a classical DC funded scheme. 
In the latter case, the funding is tied to the individual pension entitlements and the 
possibility of shifting pension/insurance provider. This is not possible in the Finnish 
case, but the employer can shift provider. This is motivated as a mechanism to foster 
competition between providers. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is unclear how effective 
this competition is. Potential efficiency effects from competition should be seen in 
the perspective of both the implications for investment policies and the availability of 
other possible governance mechanisms to ensure that the pension providers serve the 
interests of pensioners (returns and costs).
First, on the governance issue there are various ways of holding pension providers 
accountable for their performance via reporting requirements, benchmarking, peer-
reviews etc., see also Ambachtsheer (2013). Openness and access to information 
allowing outside experts to assess the performance may be as or more effective than 
the competitive forces prevailing in the present system via the option of employers to 
shift pension providers. The Finnish Centre for Pensions does publish comparisons of 
pension providers, but these activities can be strengthened.
Second, in relation to the investment policies, the nature of the liabilities (accrued 
pension rights) is that they have a long-time horizon, that is, a long-time span between 
contributions and later receipt of pensions. Moreover, this linkage is not individual 
but holds at the system level. The funded part is collective in the sense that the 
accumulated funds (including the returns) finance a part of the pension expenditures 
following the accrual rules. Therefore, the risk profile on the liability side is different 
from a classical DC funded scheme, and the regulatory framework should reflect 
this. The investment policies should be regulated based on the relevant risk metric 
given the nature of the liabilities. The pension liabilities – the technical provisions 
– are discounted at a high rate, reflecting the illiquidity of the liabilities (although 
both the level and the fact that it is not dependent on market developments at the 
relevant maturities can be discussed). A key question concerns the acceptable risk 
32 There is no solvency regulation for Keva, the State Pension Fund (VER), the Church Pension Fund (KER), 
the Finnish earnings-related pension insurance companies (Elo, Ilmarinen, Pensions-Alandia, Varma, 
Veritas) and the Seafarers’ Pension Fund (MEK).
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taking in the investment policies given the nature of the liabilities so as to reach an 
appropriate balance between risk and rates of return. There is a need for an evaluation 
of the regulatory framework to assess whether it is adequately designed given the 
characteristics of the liabilities for the funded part of the pension system.
It is difficult to compare investment performance across pension funds and countries. 
Existing comparisons do indicate that the return attained in the funded part of the 
Finnish pension system are to the low side in international comparison, both for the 
buffer funds (no solvency regulation) and the investment funds (subject to solvency 
regulation), see Finnish Centre for Pensions (2020a). This evidence is only indicative 
since comparisons of realized returns do not reveal the underlying ex ante risk exposure 
and other constraints and considerations guiding investment policies.
Finally, it is an issue whether there is a home bias in investment policies. The share of 
investments in Finland has decreased over time and constitutes currently (2019) about 
25% of total assets, slightly less – 20% – are invested in the Eurozone, and almost 
60% outside the Eurozone. Considering this from a systemic perspective, it is important 
whether the investment policies hedge the risk in the wage sum (contribution base). 
Hence, a large risk exposure to the domestic market introduces a systemic risk in the 
sense that the return on investments is low (high) when the contribution base is also 
low (high). A home bias may arise from a pressure to bring the “pension wealth” to 
use in the country, but this is not advantageous unless there is a clear case of market 
failures generating domestic capital market barriers. There is a risk that  other concerns 
than the best return-risk outcome guide investments. The Norwegian sovereign 
wealth fund has a strict policy that investments should be outside Norway (Norwegian 
Government Pension Fund Global).
In sum, there is a need for an evaluation of the regulatory framework to assess whether 
it is adequately designed, given the characteristics of the liabilities for the funded part 
of the pension system, and whether it gives the appropriate framework for investments 
policies.
4.8 Welfare arrangements and public finances
While the pension system has some autonomy, it is ultimately a part of the public sector 
as reflected in the fact that it is included in assessments of fiscal sustainability; the 
ultimate sponsors are thus the taxpayers.
The future financing problem is therefore a part of the fiscal sustainability gap assessed 
by the Ministry of Finance (2019) to be about 4.5% of GDP. A sustainability gap 
essentially implies that the current tax system (including pension contributions) is 
unable to finance the expenses following from current welfare arrangements (including 
pension entitlements). A key reason is the changing age composition of the population; 
see also Economic Policy Council (2020). Figure 4.5 shows the result of a recent EU 
analysis of the sustainability problem faced by EU countries. Finland is among the 
countries with the largest unresolved problem.
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Figure 4.5
Sustainability indicator – EU countries
Note: The sustainability indicator gives the permanent change in the government budget 
balances (in % of GDP) to ensure that the present value of revenue covers the present value of 
expenditures (taking into account the initial debt level). The computations assume a horizon 
running until 2070.  
Source: European Commission (2020).
While there are financing problems to be solved within the pension system, the larger 
part of the problem rests outside the pension system. Solving the fiscal sustainability 
problem is of crucial importance, and it would add to the credibility of the entire 
welfare-pension arrangement.
Public finances depend critically on the employment rate. Reforms to increase 
employment are thus one way to solve the fiscal sustainability problem. The 
employment rate is of some importance for the pension system, but the effect on 
pension contributions and accrual of pension rights are muted by the fact that most 
non-employed also contribute, and pension entitlements depend on earned income. 
This is reflected in the sensitivity analysis reported in Tikanmäki et al. (2019), showing 
that the needed contribution rate is relatively invariant to variations in the employment 
rate. Employment rates are therefore more important for public finances generally than 
for the pension system in a narrow sense33.
However, developments in the labour market do have some distributional implications 
since earned income is mirrored in pension entitlements. Hence, improving employment 
and qualifications can contribute to a more equal distribution of incomes and thus 
pensions more generally.
33 On a technical level, the fact that the pension system is a part of fiscal sustainability analyses stresses 
the importance of using common assumptions for projections of pension developments and public 
finances, see section 4.7.
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The long phasing-in time and the importance of steady rules for individual planning 
give a strong argument for avoiding frequent changes in the pension system. At the 
same time, the design should be robust and predictable, which is best served by 
having appropriate automatic adjustment mechanisms (rule-based adjustment), see 
discussion above. Frequent structural changes create uncertainty and have economic 
costs. As an example, the so-called competitiveness pact reduced the employers’ share 
and increased the employee’s share of the contribution rates between 2017 and 2020. 
This measure was not due to the financing needs of the pension system; instead, its aim 
was to reduce employers’ costs. Similar effects could equally well have been achieved 
through other measures.
Related to the above is the question of how contribution rates affect the incentive 
structure in the labour market; is the contribution rate a tax? The answer to this question 
depends on the extent to which the contribution paid affects the pension received for 
the individual, and the extent to which this link is perceived and taken into account. 
In the textbook case of forward-looking individuals and a mandated funded defined 
contribution scheme, the contribution rate is non-distortionary since there is such 
a one-to-one link. In a DB-PAYG scheme like the Finnish, there is some link between 
individual contributions and accrued pension benefits, but it is not one-to-one, and 
hence this is an intermediary case. The contribution rates thus have a distortionary 
element to be taken into account in conjunction with taxes when considering the 
incentive effects of the pension system on e.g. labour supply.
The incidence of the contribution rate is another issue. Does it matter whether the 
contribution is levied on the employer or the employee? In the short run with wage 
rigidity it matters, but in the medium to long run where wages can adjust there is no 
effect; this is a standard insight in labour economics; see e.g. Cahuc et al. (2014). 
What matters to employers is the total costs of labour, and to employees the after-
tax value of wages (with proper adjustment for contribution rates, cf. above). The total 
wedge between the two wage concepts is crucial for the labour market responses, but 
whether the contribution is levied on the employer or employee side does not have any 
importance in the medium to long run as it will be fully reflected in wages.
Fiscal sustainability is also of importance for the pension system through a different 
channel. As discussed above, the level of pensions should be seen in perspective of 
the fact that the welfare state provides health care and old-age care. This reduces the 
individual need for precautionary savings to deal with various hazards through life. To 
the extent that the fiscal sustainability of the welfare system is not ensured, uncertainty 
with respect to the adequacy of pensions and the need for additional pension savings 
(and eventual private acquisition of such services) becomes more relevant. In addition, 
there are distributional consequences to be taken into account.
Finally, the sustainability discussion has both a technical and political side. The 
above discussion has mainly focused on the technical question of whether the budget 
requirements for fiscal sustainability are met.
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Technical sustainability is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Political 
sustainability concerns whether the outcomes of the system are considered adequate 
and fair. If not, the support for the system may dwindle, building up pressure for 
political changes.
4.9 Financial sustainability – methods and analysis
Long-term analyses and projections are made regularly at the Finnish Centre for 
Pensions; the latest is reported in Tikanmäki et al. (2019). The projection reports 
the development in total pension expenditures, benefit levels, distribution and the 
financing of private sector earnings-related pensions. The analyses also include 
sensitivity analyses considering the role of assumptions of key demographic and 
economic variables.
Key elements in the projections are developments in demographics, in the labour 
market and key macro variables (price and wage inflation, rates of return). The 
demographic variables follow Statistics Finland’s population projection. Employment 
projections are done independently based on a so-called cohort component model. 
This is a deterministic model, rich on institutional details, but it does not include 
any behavioural responses. Pension expenditures are computed separately for each 
pension scheme in an earnings-related pension expenditure module, see Appendices 8 
and 9 in Tikanmäki et al. (2019).
The outcomes of the projection are clearly laid out and discussed in the report, and 
the method applied is relevant and well documented. The projection thus provides an 
indispensable input for discussing the developments in pensions and their financing.
A key aspect in the projection is the development in employment rates. The overall 
developments in labour force participation, employment and unemployment are 
determined in the LTP model. The structural unemployment rate is exogenously 
given (7.9%). The projection is done at a group level according to sex and age. 
The more detailed split, including education, is done in the sub-model ELSI. This 
sequential method raises some questions on consistency, especially whether long-
term developments in, for instance, employment rates and retirement behaviour can 
be made without taking into account e.g. developments in education and health 
(longevity). Basing projections on a more explicit overlapping generations model would 
be one way to incorporate important feedback effects, e.g. from pension replacement 
rates to retirement behaviour.
This also brings up the question whether patterns observed in the past are reliable 
predictors of future developments. Specifically, retirement preferences and behaviour 
may change over time and across cohorts. While in the past retirement was associated 
with a deterioration of mental and physical capabilities and thus hardship in continuing 
working, retirement is increasingly seen as a third life phase with options for realizing 
various goals. Increases in education and other factors may work in the opposite 
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direction, making some wanting to stay on longer in the labour market. Changes in 
the labour market are also important; structural changes, skill and task biases may 
influence the possibilities for continued work. Both early and late retirement relative to 
the statutory retirement may increase, and the projection would gain in value by more 
clearly integrating such issues in the sensitivity analyses.
A specific issue arises in relation to official projections, in particular of fiscal 
sustainability, see Tikanmäki et al. (2019, p. 43). Clearly, different institutions can arrive 
at different projections of key variables like e.g. the employment rate, and separate and 
independent assessments serve to qualify the debate and improve the information set. 
However, it is a potential source of confusion that projections for the pension system 
are not done under the same assumptions as assessments of fiscal sustainability by the 
Ministry of Finance.
This problem could be resolved by reporting projections based on both the own best 
assessments and based on government assessments of key variables such as the 
employment rate.
Related is the issue of whether projections should be produced based on existing 
legislation, rules etc. or more plausible/projected trajectories. A case in point is the 
indexation of Kela pensions.
Formally, these pensions are price indexed. Historical experience and other arguments 
suggest that it is unlikely that they will only be regulated according to price changes 
over longer periods. Therefore, the projection assumes the Kela pensions to be indexed 
50–50 by wage and price increases (an appendix discusses alternative indexation rules 
and their implications, see Tikanmäki et al. [2019]). This can be a source of confusion. 
If the projection serves to inform the public of what can be expected in terms of pension 
developments, the latter assumption is more plausible. If the purpose of the projection 
is to inform policy makers, stakeholders etc. on developments and the implied need for 
policy initiatives, the former assumption is most appropriate.
It is also an issue how the funded part of the pensions and the associated returns 
should be handled. The projection is deterministic and illustrates uncertainty by means 
of sensitivity analyses, which is a common approach in such analyses. However, since 
the rate of return is risky, the certainty equivalent approach taken may not fully reveal 
the sensitivity of the financing to development in returns and the risk taking of the 
pension funds. It would strengthen the analyses if risk could be explicitly integrated 
rather than just discussed in terms of sensitivity analyses. For the latter it would also 
be relevant to consider combined scenarios to produce a better overview of possible 
trajectories.
The long-term projection assumes a real rate of return of 2.5% for the period 2019–
2028, and 3.5% from 2029 and onwards, see Tikanmäki et al. (2019). Sensitivity 
analyses show that a scenario where the real rate of return is one percentage point 
lower than in the baseline scenario would imply that the contributions for TyEL pensions 
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would have to increase to 32% rather than 30% in the baseline scenario. The rate of 
return assumptions in the baseline scenario seems to be to the high side compared to 
most long-term predictions. Projections based on calibrated overlapping generations 
models have a real rate of return on safe bonds at around 0.5% or lower in 2030 and 
falling thereafter, see Papetti (2019) and Bielecki et al. (2018). Pension funds may be 
able to generate a higher return by accepting more risk, but this brings up the question 
of how to take account of this risk in the long-term projections.
4.10 Discussion
The long-run financial viability of the pension system is not ensured. Current 
contribution rates are not consistent with the future benefit expenditures following 
from accrued pension entitlements. The financing problem develops gradually but 
steadily. Although the longevity adjustments (the life expectancy coefficient affecting 
benefit levels and the indexation of the statutory retirement age) constitute significant 
adjustment mechanisms contributing to the financial robustness of the system, 
they are not sufficient. Hence, changes in longevity are not fully accommodated by 
these automatic adjustment mechanisms. A low fertility rate is another important 
demographic factor influencing the financial viability of the system.
Addressing the financial sustainability problem is thus of utmost importance to ensure 
the robustness of the system and, ultimately, its credibility. The financing problem 
is developing gradually, but it is important to determine a reform strategy due to 
the long phasing-in period and to avoid unintentional intergenerational distribution 
consequences.
The modes of adjustment are contribution rates, benefit levels and retirement ages. 
Given the already implemented indexation of the statutory retirement age (and changes 
in the mechanism are ruled out), the focus turns to contribution rates and benefit levels. 
An issue of discretion vs rules arises here. Reforms from time to time are one way to 
adjust the system. This has the advantage that more information is accumulated, but 
the disadvantage that it creates uncertainty on the future design of the pension system. 
There is also a risk that reforms are delayed, which may both add to the problems and 
have unintentional intergenerational distribution consequences.
A more rule-based system has automatic adjustment mechanisms, such as the life 
expectancy coefficient, and indexation of statutory retirement ages to longevity. Such 
mechanisms have the advantage that they are planned well in time, and that the 
adjustments are only triggered if needed. Since the automatic adjustment mechanisms 
tied to longevity developments are insufficient to ensure the financial viability of the 
system, additional automatic mechanisms should be considered. One option is an 
automatic balancing mechanism – as seen in e.g. the Swedish scheme – to ensure the 
financial viability of the system. Such a mechanism can run either via contributions or 
benefit levels.
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In the past, there have been pension reforms to address challenges to the pension 
system, and the social partners have taken responsibility to ensure adjustments 
and changes, see Barr (2013). In the present situation, it is important that the social 
partners decide on a reform strategy. The longer a decision is postponed, the larger the 
need for a reform and uncertainty on the future of the pension system.
Importantly, public finances are not satisfying the criteria for fiscal sustainability; that 
is, the current tax system is projected to deliver insufficient revenue to cover projected 
future expenditures. Demographic trends affect the labour force and thus revenue and 
expenditures on pensions, health, and old-age care. The fiscal sustainability problem is 
large in international comparison. Ultimately, the financial sustainability of the pension 
system and other welfare arrangements must be considered jointly since lack of 
sustainability creates uncertainty detrimental to the basic objective of providing social 
insurance. The issue of sustainability not only involves the technical specificities but 
also political sustainability; is the system considered fair and delivering an acceptable 
outcome? Some of these aspects were discussed in Section 3 and should be integrated 
in the discussion of pension reforms.
Indexation – both the wage and the pension index – raises difficult dilemmas. The 
current indexation rules contribute to creating some financing space when real wages 
grow. However, they also cause a gap between pensions and wages for the employed, 
therefore increasing inequality. Without compromising the financial viability of the 
system, there is a choice between initial benefit levels and their indexation to price and 
wage developments.
For the funded part, it is unclear whether the regulatory framework for investment is 
appropriate given the nature and risk of the liability side. The funded part constitutes 
a significant part of the financing, and a sub-optimal return-risk balance in investment 
policies has implications for how much the funded part can contribute to the financing 
of pensions. The earnings-related pensions with defined benefit rules do not have an 
individual link between funded contributions and pension entitlements, and this is 
important for the risk profile of the system. The current regulatory framework is a hybrid, 
which has evolved over time, and it is not clear that it is adequate given the structure 
of the system, and there is a need for careful analysis to ensure that it is appropriately 
designed.
Finally, important inputs into the political discussion are reliable analyses to identify 
challenges, clarify possible solutions and for quantification. The existing analyses 
provide valuable inputs and a very solid basis for such discussions. However, given the 
importance of these analyses it is worthwhile to invest more in the analytical tools by 
further model developments.
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5 Concluding remarks
Pension systems around the world are challenged, not least by demographic changes. 
In particular, defined benefit systems are under pressure, and a number of countries 
have made radical reforms moving towards defined contribution schemes placing more 
risk on the individual.
The backbone of the Finnish pension system are the earnings-related defined benefit 
pensions with Kela pensions (guarantee and national) as a backstop ensuring a 
minimum income for pensioners. The advantage of this system is that it ensures broad 
coverage, and it is similar across the labour market, which is conducive for flexibility 
and adjustment. There are no acute problems calling for reforms, but there are a 
number of design issues discussed in this report. The key issue is to decide on a reform 
strategy such that problems can be addressed in due time, and the consequences of 
adjustments, including the implications for intergenerational risk diversification and 
distribution, can be carefully considered.
The basic structure of the Finnish pension system has proven robust. In international 
comparison, the outcome is among the best performers. In international perspective, 
the financing challenge pertaining to the pension system per se is also relatively small, 
but the sustainability issue also involves the overall welfare package. Public finances 
face a significant sustainability problem, which is large in international comparison. 
This has a negative spill-over effect on the pension system raising credibility questions 
on future welfare arrangements.
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Annex I Remit for the evaluation
The overall purpose of the evaluation project is to give an outside assessment of the 
adequacy and sustainability of the Finnish pension system.
The Finnish system consists of statutory earnings-related occupational pensions and 
residence-based and means tested basic pension (national pension and guarantee 
pensions). The earnings-related part of the system is a hybrid one which is partly funded 
and based on a defined benefit principle.
Earnings-related pensions are financed mostly by employer and employee contributions 
and investment returns. The total contribution rate amounts to ca 25% of gross wages. 
About 30% of the total pension liability is funded.
Pension adequacy
The adequacy of pensions can be evaluated by assessing the absolute and relative 
income levels of pensioners and the replacement ratios of pensions. These are 
documented in the many publications of the Finnish Centre for Pensions. International 
comparisons are also relevant. In addition to the present income distribution and 
poverty rate of pensioners also the projected future distributions are relevant. Future 
pensions will be affected by the longevity coefficient and indexation rules, which may 
change the relative income position of retirees depending on the developments of 
longevity and average earnings.
The primary focus in the evaluation should be on the statutory earnings-related 
pensions which form the basis for pension income. However, when considering the 
adequacy both the national pension scheme and the earnings-related pension scheme 
and their joint impact should be acknowledged.
Sustainability of the pension finance
The sustainability of the financing of the earnings-related pension system is assessed 
regularly by the Finnish Centre for Pensions. This is done by using model-based 
scenarios to compute the sufficient level of contributions in the long term, given the 
current rules. If there is no upward pressure on the contribution rate in the future the 
system is viewed as sustainable. The scenarios are based on the population forecast of 
Statistics Finland and a set of assumptions on economic variables.
The method and assumptions of these computations could be assessed in the 
evaluation. It would also be relevant to consider the aspects of intergenerational equity 
and the built-in behavioural incentives of the pension system. The last part of the 
assessment could contain suggestions of possible reforms.
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